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I. OVERVIEW
At common law, a curious blending of principles from both
contract and property law governs the landlord and tenant rela-
tionship. While a lease is a contract, it is also an agreement for
the transfer of an estate. South Carolina traditionally has pre-
served a distinction between the property law and contractual
relationships of the landlord and tenant and has treated the ten-
ant's rental obligation as one arising solely out of the conveyance
of the estate, independent from performance by the landlord of
other contractual obligations contained within the lease
agreement.1
The South Carolina Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
(RLTA),2 which governs most residential rental agreements en-
tered into or renewed on or after July 8, 1986, alters this tradi-
tional relationship. The RLTA shifts residential South Carolina
1. See Rowland & Sons, Inc. v. Bock, 150 S.C. 490, 148 S.E. 549 (1929)(landlord
breach of agreement to alter does not permit tenant to vacate); Williams v. Salmond, 79
S.C. 459, 460, 61 S.E. 79, 79 (1908)("Any obligation to put the property in repair...
must be imposed by some contract apart from the mere lease of the land for a given
term."); Ripley v. Wightman, 15 S.C.L. (4 McCord) 447 (1828); see also Mallard v. Duke,
131 S.C. 175, 126 S.E. 525 (1925). But cf. Burkhalter v. Townsend, 139 S.C. 324, 138 S.E.
34 (1927) (contract duty to mitigate imposed upon landlord in action for rent). A detailed
analysis of the relationship between contract and property law in the landlord and ten-
ant relationship may be found in Chase & Taylor, Landlord and Tenant: A Study in
Property and Contract, 30 VILL. L. REv. 571 (1985) and the articles cited therein. See
generally I AM. LAW OF PROPERTY 202-05 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-40-10 to -940 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
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landlord and tenant law significantly from the treatment of cer-
tain obligations as duties arising solely from a conveyance of
property toward the treatment of all obligations, including those
imposed by statute, as duties arising from a bilateral contract.
The most apparent result of this shift in orientation is that
under the RLTA, for the first time in South Carolina, a tenant's
duty to pay rent is not dependent solely upon receiving posses-
sion of the premises; it is conditioned also upon continued per-
formance by the landlord of statutory and contractual obliga-
tions to maintain the premises.'
The RLTA also should remove from South Carolina resi-
dential landlord and tenant law the last vestiges of interesse ter-
mini, a peculiar common-law doctrine that distinguishes be-
tween creation of the contractual and property law relationships
and holds that the landlord and tenant relationship cannot exist
until the tenant actually enters the premises. Furthermore, the
RLTA imposes an obligation characteristic of contract law to act
in good faith5 and clarifies the landlord's duty arising out of con-
tract law to mitigate damages, even for breach of the traditional
property law obligation to pay rent.
The RLTA is modeled after, but deviates substantially
from, the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act.7 Its
express purpose is "to simplify, clarify, modernize and revise"
South Carolina landlord and tenant law and "to encourage land-
lords and tenants to maintain and improve the quality of hous-
ing."8 Included among the changes enacted are the adoption of
limited restraints on retaliatory eviction and other retaliatory
actions by a landlord, 9 a change in the status of a hold-over ten-
3. See infra notes 96-119 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-220 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
6. See infra notes 227-34 and accompanying text.
7. 7B U.L.A. 427 (1972). A bill based upon the Uniform Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act was introduced in the South Carolina House of Representatives in March
1981, see 11981 H.R.J. 1092 and H.R. 2539, 104th Gen'l Assembly, 1st Sess. (1981), but
never was reported out of committee. Another bill, introduced in February 1983, also
failed to reach the floor of the House. See 1 1983 H.R.J. 1116 and H.R. 2518, 105th Gen'l
Assembly, 1st Sess. (1983). The bill ultimately adopted was introduced in January 1985
as H.R. 2119. It was approved by the House in May 1985, amended by the Senate in
February 1986, and ratified by both houses as amended in March 1986.
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-20(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
9. See infra notes 256-75 and accompanying text.
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ant from a tenant-at-will to a tenant for a new term,10 and, ar-
guably, a significant, although perhaps unintended, broadening
of the landlord's exposure to tort claims by a tenant who suffers
personal injury on the leased premises."
The purpose of this Article is to review the RLTA and the
many new concepts it incorporates into the landlord and tenant
relationship under South Carolina law. Following this overview
and a brief description of the coverage of the RLTA in Part II,
Part III considers the extent of agreement necessary to create a
landlord and tenant relationship under the RLTA, the expressed
and implied terms of that agreement, and the tenant's right to
demand actual possession. Part IV focuses upon the duties,
rights, and remedies that exist during the landlord and tenant
relationship, including the rights of either party to terminate or
seek damages in particular circumstances. The relationship of
the parties after either party exercises a right to terminate, or
upon abandonment or expiration of the rental agreement, is de-
scribed in Part V. In Part VI, certain procedural rules included
in the RLTA are discussed. In the course of this review, particu-
lar attention is given to ambiguous provisions of the RLTA, for
which additional clarification appears appropriate to satisfy the
stated goals of the legislature in its enactment.
II. COVERAGE OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA RLTA
The RLTA governs all rights and obligations of parties to
any "rental agreement" for a "dwelling unit" located in South
Carolina. 2 The term "rental agreement" is defined broadly in
the RLTA to include "all agreements, written or oral, . . em-
bodying the terms and conditions concerning the use and occu-
pancy of a dwelling unit and premises."' 3 A "dwelling unit" in-
cludes any "structure or the part of a structure that is used as a
home, residence, or sleeping place by one person who maintains
a household or by two or more persons who maintain a common
10. See infra notes 252-55 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 139-52 and accompanying text.
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-110 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
13. Id. § 27-40-210(12). The limitation that rental agreements must concern the oc-
cupancy, as well as the use, of a dwelling unit excludes easements and profits from the
coverage of the RLTA.
19881
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household.1 14 Thus, any agreement concerning the use and occu-
pancy of a premises, including a mobile home,15 as a sleeping
place by a person maintaining a household on the premises will
be governed by the RLTA, unless one of eight specific excep-
tions under section 27-40-120 applies."
Prior common-law and statutory principles of landlord and
tenant law continue to govern all tenancies not specifically in-
cluded within the scope of the RLTA. A threshold determina-
tion regarding the nature of use of the premises is, therefore,
necessary to determine whether the RLTA will apply. If the
premises are to be used as a dwelling unit, as defined under the
RLTA, and if the use is not of a type specifically excluded from
coverage of the RLTA, then the appropriate analysis under the
RLTA is mandatory, and the RLTA displaces the traditional
South Carolina rules regarding the creation and existence of a
tenancy.
III. CREATION OF THE LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP
Two distinctions exist between the RLTA and prior law re-
garding the creation of the landlord and tenant relationship.
First, the RLTA provides new principles for determining the ex-
istence and terms of a contractual relationship between the par-
ties. Second, in residential situations, the RLTA eliminates the
common-law requirement of an actual entry prior to recognition
of the tenancy.
A. Formation and Contents of the Rental Agreement
The RLTA applies only to those tenancies created by a
written or oral rental agreement between the landlord and ten-
ant.17 A sufficient rental agreement apparently needs only to
14. Id. § 27-40-210(3).
15. Id.
16. Residences not subject to the RLTA include certain institutional residences such
as at hospitals and educational institutions, occupancy under contracts of sale for the
dwelling unit, transient occupancy of hotels and similar rooms, occupancy by an em-
ployee conditioned upon employment in and about the premises, occupancy by the
owner of a condominium or the holder of a proprietary lease in a cooperative, occupancy
of premises used primarily for agricultural purposes, and occupancy of premises gov-
erned by the Vacation Time Sharing Plan Act. Id. § 27-40-120.
17. See §§ 27-40-110, -210(12).
[Vol. 39
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identify the dwelling unit and provide, in some manner, for its
use and occupancy by a tenant.18 The parties may expressly
agree to additional provisions of the rental agreement, or provi-
sions may be supplied by the RLTA or by a writing signed by
only one party if the other party has partially performed in the
manner specified by the RLTA.19
Even terms once considered "essential" to a valid lease now
may be implied. If rent is not expressly agreed upon, the rental
agreement does not fail. Instead, the RLTA will imply a rental
amount equal to the fair market rental value of the premises.20
Terms for payment of rent also are supplied by the RLTA if not
expressly set forth in the rental agreement.21 Importantly, in the
absence of a definite lease term, the RLTA provides for the crea-
tion of a month-to-month tenancy in nearly all cases.22
Under prior South Carolina law, the relationship of landlord
and tenant is recognized only when there exists evidence of both
contract and property law relationships. Some form of agree-
ment between the parties typically reflects the contractual na-
ture of the landlord and tenant relationship. The tenant's entry
and possession are fundamental characteristics of the property
law relationship.23
18. See id.
19. The provisions of a written rental agreement may be enforceable for a term of
not more than one year despite the failure of one party to sign and deliver the instru-
ment. If the landlord accepts rent without reservation, a rental agreement signed and
delivered only by the tenant is enforceable as if fully executed and delivered. Similarly,
if the tenant accepts possession and pays rent without reservation, a rental agreement
signed only by the landlord and delivered is enforceable. Id. § 27-40-320.
20. Id. § 27-40-310(b).
21. Id. § 27-40-310(c).
22. Id. § 27-40-310(d). The only exception is that a roomer who pays weekly rent is
deemed to have a week-to-week tenancy in the absence of other express agreement. Id.
The definition under § 27-40-210(13) of a roomer, as distinguished from other tenants, is
unclear. Several states have adopted language more clearly defining a roomer as a person
who occupies a dwelling unit that lacks a major bathroom or kitchen facility and who
shares such a facility, defined as a bathtub or shower, toilet, refrigerator, stove, or
kitchen sink, with other occupants. See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 383.545 (Supp. 1986); Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 76-1410(12) (1986). Such a formulation is also a reasonable interpretation of
South Carolina's definition.
23. Although there is authority that a tenancy may exist in the absence of a valid,
express lease, if there has been actual entry and occupation, Columbia Ry., Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Jones, 119 S.C. 480, 112 S.E. 267 (1922), the common law has required some form
of agreement or consent to create the tenancy. Stewart-Jones Co. v. Shehan, 127 S.C.
451, 457, 121 S.E. 374, 376 (1924). But see S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-33-10(3) (Law. Co-op.
1976) (defining a tenant at will as a person occupying real estate without an agreement).
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The necessary extent of the contractual relationship under
prior South Carolina law, however, is uncertain. An agreement
containing the "essential terms" of a lease is evidence of a ten-
ancy when the lessee has made actual entry onto the premises2 '
or is evidence of a lessor and lessee relationship prior to such
entry by the lessee.25 Courts have described the essential terms
as a grant of possession and exclusive use of the premises, a defi-
nite rental amount, and a certain term.26 An agreement merely
transferring the "right to the possession and control" of land,
however, also has been deemed sufficient evidence of the crea-
tion of a tenancy. 7 Indeed, even an agreement that is insuffi-
cient to constitute a valid lease may be a sufficient basis for a
tenancy when followed by actual entry. The insufficiency of the
agreement as a technical lease is no obstacle to a tenancy, be-
cause "entry and occupation under an invalid or defective lease
will create the relation of the landlord and tenant."2
To distinguish the occupation of a tenant from that of a
mere trespasser, each of these cases contemplates some form of
consent. Confusion abounds, however, regarding the form that
consent must take. Consent need not be in the form of a valid
lease, which creates a contractual relationship of lessor and
lessee prior to entry. An agreement that is not a valid lease
may be sufficient to form the contractual relationship necessary
to support the creation of a tenancy following entry.
Thus, even in the absence of certain express terms that may
be essential to a lease, which would create a contractual rela-
tionship of lessor and lessee prior to entry, sufficient contractual
agreement still may exist to create a tenancy at the time of en-
try. For example, a landlord and tenant relationship may exist
without an express contractual agreement regarding rent, which
is an essential term of a lease. "If the relation of landlord and
24. B-L-S Construction Co. v. St. Stephen Knitwear, Inc., 276 S.C. 612, 281 S.E.2d
129 (1981).
25. Wilcox v. Bostick, 57 S.C. 151, 35 S.E. 496 (1900).
26. B-L-S Construction, 276 S.C. 612,.281 S.E.2d 129; Columbia Ry., Gas & Elec.
Co., 119 S.C. 480, 112 S.E. 267.
27. Rakestraw v. Floyd, 54 S.C. 288, 32 S.E. 419 (1899). For further discussion of
methods of creating a tenancy in South Carolina, see Spitz, Is It Time to Reform Land-
lord Remedies in South Carolina?, 34 S.C.L. REV. 787 (1983),
28. Columbia Ry., Gas & Elec. Co., 119 S.C. at 491, 112 S.E. at 271.
29. For a discussion of differences between a lessee and a tenant, see infra notes 45-
46 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 39
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol39/iss3/3
1988] RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD TENANT ACT 501
tenant existed between the plaintiff and the defendant, the law
would imply an agreement to pay a reasonable compensation for
the use of the property, in the absence of an express agreement
to that effect."30 Such distinction under prior law between a
technical lease and other forms of consent that may sustain a
tenancy have lent uncertainty to this area of the law. In con-
trast, the RLTA focuses primarily upon the intended purpose of
an agreement to govern use or occupancy of a premises, rather
than upon the technical inclusion of particular provisions. The
RLTA thereby diminishes the uncertainty that may remain at
common law regarding the existence of a sufficient contractual
relationship to create the landlord and tenant relationship.
The RLTA also may subject a tenant to additional rules
and regulations adopted by the landlord pursuant to section 27-
40-520, which become part of the rental agreement by operation
of section 27-40-210(12).31 Such rules and regulations are not re-
quired to be physically attached to the rental agreement, but
such a practice is advisable since the rules and regulations are
enforceable only if the tenant "has notice of them at the time he
enters into the rental agreement, or when they are adopted.
'32
30. The South Carolina Terminal Co. v. South Carolina and Georgia RR Co., 52 S.C.
1, 21, 29 S.E. 565, 573 (1898).
31. The rules and regulations are enforceable only if:
(1) their purpose is to promote the convenience, safety, or welfare of the te-
nants in the premises, preserve the landlord's property from abusive use, or
make a fair distribution of services and facilities held out for the tenants
generally;
(2) they are reasonably related to the purpose for which they are adopted;
(3) they apply to all tenants in the premises in a fair manner;
(4) they are sufficiently explicit in their prohibition, direction, or limitation of
the tenant's conduct to fairly inform him of what he must or must not do to
comply;
(5) they are not for the purpose of evading the obligations of the landlord;
(6) the tenant has notice of them at the time he enters into the rental agree-
ment, or when they are adopted.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-520(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
32. Id. In addition to giving notice of rules and regulations under § 27-40-520, a
landlord is required to make several other disclosures prior to or at the time of entry into
the rental agreement. If a landlord rents five or more adjoining dwelling units and calcu-
lates security deposits in different manners for different tenants, he must provide the
standards for calculating security deposits to each prospective tenant before the rental
agreement is reached. The landlord may provide this information directly or he may
conspicuously post it on the premises or at the place at which rent is paid. The landlord
may not be able to retain the full amount of the security deposit for damages incurred on
the premises during the tenancy if he fails to provide the required information prior to
9
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The landlord may adopt such rules and regulations after the
rental agreement is entered into, but if they substantially mod-
ify the tenant's bargain, he must give notice to the tenant at the
time of their adoption of a right to object. The regulations are
unenforceable against any tenant who objects in writing to the
landlord within thirty days after the regulations are adopted. s
This latter provision reverses the approach of the Uniform
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, which makes regulations
enacted after entry into the rental agreement unenforceable un-
less the tenant expressly consents to them. 4 The South Carolina
RLTA, instead, provides that the regulations are automatically
enforceable unless the tenant expressly objects to the regulations
within thirty days. Moreover, the thirty-day period runs from
the date of the promulgation of the regulations, not from the
date on which the tenant receives notice.
The RLTA provides that notice of the regulations and of
the right to object must be given "upon adoption" of the regula-
tions, but does not make clear the meaning of the term "upon
adoption." If interpreted literally to mean that notice must be
given on the day of promulgation, then a potential pitfall awaits
the unwary landlord who delays notice for even a day. If the
provision is interpreted instead to mean that the landlord may
give notice within a reasonable time after promulgation, then
the tenant effectively receives less than thirty days in which to
object since the objection period runs from the date of promul-
gation, not notice. A practical interpretation may be to deem the
date of delivery of the notice as the date of promulgation,
thereby protecting both parties from unintended consequences.
Also left unresolved by the RLTA approach is the status of
the rules and regulations during the thirty-day period prior to
receipt of an objection. The statute does not expressly stay the
effective date of regulations adopted pursuant to section 27-40-
520 until the thirty-day period has expired. If the statute were
entry into the rental agreement. Id. § 27-40-410(c).
Every landlord or person authorized to enter into a rental agreement on his behalf is
required to disclose in writing the name and address of an owner or an agent of an owner
authorized to receive service of process or other notices or demands. The information
should be provided upon entry into the rental agreement and must be kept current
throughout the term of the lease. Id. § 27-40-420.
33. Id. § 27-40-520(b).
34. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACr § 3.102(b), 7B U.LA. 475 (1972).
[Vol. 39
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interpreted, however, as permitting the regulations to take effect
immediately upon promulgation, then the bargain of the rental
agreement could be modified unilaterally by the landlord for the
period prior to the tenant's objection. Thus, the better rule is
that regulations adopted pursuant to section 27-40-520 do not
take effect until the tenant consents to their enforcement or the
thirty-day period for objection has expired.
In addition to supplying key provisions of the rental agree-
ment not otherwise agreed upon by the parties, the RLTA may
prohibit the enforcement of certain provisions that are included
in an express agreement. A provision of a rental agreement or of
a settlement between the parties may be deemed unconscionable
when made. The court may refuse to enforce the unconscionable
provision or may limit its application to avoid an unconscionable
result. If the rental agreement is unconscionable in its entirety,
the court may refuse to enforce any part of the rental
agreement. 5
Certain other provisions benefiting the landlord not only are
unenforceable, but may give rise to actual and punitive damages
against the landlord. Such prohibited provisions include any
agreement by the tenant in the rental agreement to waive rights
or remedies under the RLTA, to permit a confession of judg-
ment on any claim arising out of the rental agreement, or to
limit any liability of the landlord arising under law.36
To further discourage a landlord from even attempting to
take advantage of a tenant who may not be aware of his legal
right to challenge such provisions, the Uniform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act permits a tenant to recover actual
35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-230 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). Determining what consti-
tutes an unconscionable lease provision is difficult in South Carolina. The court of ap-
peals defined unconscionability under the Uniform Commercial Code in connection with
a lease of personal property as "including the absence of meaningful choice on the part
of one party due to one-sided contract provisions, together with terms which are so op-
pressive that no reasonable person would make them and no fair and honest person
would accept them." Jones Leasing, Inc. v. Gene Phillips & Assocs., 282 S.C. 327, 331,
318 S.E.2d 31, 33 (Ct. App. 1984). In a dissent to Litchfield Co. of S.C. v. Kiriakides, 290
S.C. 221, 349 S.E.2d 344 (Ct. App. 1986), Judge Gardner suggested that a finding of
unconscionability under a commercial real estate lease depends upon a consideration of
"all the circumstances of the case." Id. at 230, 349 S.E.2d at 350.
36. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-330 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). This section does not
invalidate bona fide liquidated damages provisions for loss of rent from a tenant's early
termination of a lease. Id. § 27-40-330(c).
1988]
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damages, plus a statutory measure of punitive damages and at-
torney's fees, if the landlord deliberately includes any such pro-
vision in the rental agreement with knowledge that it is prohib-
ited. 7 The South Carolina RLTA enacts an analogous provision
for damages. However, the South Carolina provision is imprecise
and subject to several interpretations.
Unlike the uniform version, the RLTA creates different
penalties depending upon whether the inclusion of a provision
known to be prohibited was deliberate or malicious.3 8 A deliber-
ate act seems to include all intentional acts, and distinctions be-
tween intentional and malicious acts are not unfamiliar. Indeed,
South Carolina cases previously addressing the right to punitive
damages have distinguished between intentional and malicious
actions, noting that "'[o]ne may intentionally do an act which
proves to be unlawful without the slightest design to do a wrong
to anyone.' ",9
However, it may be difficult in the context of section 27-40-
330(b) to discern the difference between such situations in the
absence of a more precise definition of deliberate and malicious
acts. The landlord's liability, whether he acts deliberately or ma-
liciously, arises only if he knows the provision to be unenforce-
able.40 Under section 27-40-240(a)(3), a person knows a fact only
if he has actual knowledge of it.4 1 The difficult question then
arises over whether a person who has actual knowledge that a
provision is unenforceable can ever deliberately include that
provision without also having some "design to do a wrong." For
example, a landlord would have no apparent reason intentionally
to include a confession of judgment, knowing it to be unenforce-
able, unless he had some "design to do a wrong. "42
37. UNiF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 1.403(b), 7B U.LA. 450 (1985).
38. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-330(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
39. Cox v. Coleman, 189 S.C. 218, 200 S.E. 762 (1939) (quoting Kibler & S. Ry., 62
S.C. 252, 40 S.E. 556 (1901)). A malicious act, however, likely must be deliberate in every
case. See Eaves v. Broad River Elec. Coop., Inc., 277 S.C. 475, 289 S.E.2d 414 (1982) (for
purposes of malicious prosecution action, "Malice is defined as 'the deliberate intentional
doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse.' ") (quoting Margolis v. Telech, 239
S.C. 232, 122 S.E.2d 417 (1961)).
40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-330(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
41. Id. § 27-40-240(a).
42. Arguably, a landlord could act without malice if he deliberately includes a provi-
sion, but has no intent to enforce the provision. Such a distinction, however, appears
unnecessary if the remainder of § 27-40-330(b) is intended to limit a landlord's exposure
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More significantly, section 27-40-330(b) imposes liability
upon landlords who deliberately include an unenforceable provi-
sion in a rental agreement only if the landlord also "attempts to
exercise the rights created by the agreement. 4 3 The apparent
purpose of this proviso, which does not appear in the uniform
version, is to limit the landlord's exposure to situations in which
the landlord not only includes a prohibited provision in the
rental agreement, but also actually attempts to enforce that pro-
hibited provision.
A literal interpretation of the proviso as enacted, however,
suggests a far different result. When a prohibited provision is
deliberately included in the agreement, the RLTA, if literally in-
terpreted, would impose liability upon the exercise of any rights
created by any part of the rental agreement. Indeed, since unen-
forceable provisions presumably create no rights of the landlord
under the rental agreement, there is a certain absence of preci-
sion, if not logic, in any other interpretation that would limit an
attempt "to exercise the rights created by the agreement" to
mean merely an attempt to enforce a prohibited provision.
Nevertheless, only this latter, more narrow, interpretation
limits the landlord's exposure in a manner that gives any logical
effect to the statutory language. Thus, it seems more probable
that the legislative intent of section 27-40-330(b) was to limit
exposure for damages to cases in which a landlord deliberately
or maliciously includes and also attempts to enforce prohibited
sections of the rental agreement."
only to situations in which enforcement of the provision is attempted.
43. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-330(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
44. Despite the apparent similarity of purpose of the next sentence of § 27-40-
330(b), which provides for damages upon the malicious use of a prohibited provision, the
language of that sentence differs from the prior sentence. Malicious use of a rental agree-
ment with a prohibited provision gives rise to a claim for damages if the landlord "at-
tempts to exercise the rights created thereby." Id. § 27-40-330(b)(emphasis added). Al-
though the language again is subject to a broader interpretation and, if given a narrow
reading would suggest an illogical premise that rights arise from unenforceable provi-
sions, the language adopted appears more clearly intended to be narrowly construed to
refer only to the attempted enforcement of a prohibited provision. Although the differ-
ence in language in these sentences might be viewed as an indication of a different legis-
lative intent, the RLTA does not indicate that the difference is other than inadvertent.
1988]
13
Wilcox: A Lawyer's Guide to the South Carolina Residential Landlord and T
Published by Scholar Commons, 1988
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
B. Creation and Enforcement of the Right to Possession
1. The Right to Actual Possession
The existence of a valid lease contract does not necessarily
mean that a tenancy exists at common law. In South Carolina, a
distinction has remained at common law between the mere con-
tractual relationship of a lessor and lessee and the relationship
of a landlord and tenant which incorporates property law princi-
ples as well. The term "lessee" has been used to describe a party
who has only a contractual right in a lease, but has not yet ac-
quired any estate in the premises. Under the common-law doc-
trine of interesse termini, as applied in South Carolina, only af-
ter entry into possession is a lessee regarded as a tenant with a
recognizable estate at property law. Until such entry, the lessee
has been said to hold only an interesse termini4 5
Although an interesse termini may arise at common law
whenever a lease provides for commencement of the term at a
later date, the distinction between an interesse termini and a
true tenancy is particularly significant when the date for com-
mencement of the lease term has arrived, but the lessee has not
yet taken or received possession. Under South Carolina common
law the remedy of a lessee against a lessor who refuses to pro-
vide possession at the commencement of the term is limited to
the contractual remedy of damages. "[I]n an action by the lessee
to recover possession of the lessor, the lessee must allege an en-
try under the lease; otherwise, having no estate in the land, he
cannot compel the owner in possession to deliver him the
possession.
''
,
6
The effect in South Carolina of interesse termini upon a
lessor's right to collect rent from a lessee during the period after
the date for commencement, but prior to the lessee taking pos-
session, is less clear.47 In Simon v. Kirkpatrick,48 the court in-
voked interesse termini in such a situation, but did not limit the
lessor to a contract remedy for damages alone as would have
45. Simon v. Kirkpatrick, 141 S.C. 251, 139 S.E. 614 (1927); see also Note, Is Inter-
esse Termini Necessary?, 18 COLUM. L. REV. 595 (1918); I AM. LAw OF PROPERTY 220-21
(A. Casner ed. 1952).
46. Wilcox v. Bostick, 57 S.C. 151, 154-55, 35 S.E. 496, 497 (1900).
47. See Spitz, supra note 27, at 813-15.
48, 141 S.C. 251, 139 S.E. 614 (1927).
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been appropriate under a strict application of the doctrine.
The many peculiarities of interesse termini have been elim-
inated from residential landlord and tenant situations by the
RLTA. The RLTA discards the common-law distinction be-
tween a lessee and a tenant and extends the property law right
of possession to tenants who have never entered the premises.
Adopting the terminology of the Uniform Residential Landlord
and Tenant Act, the South Carolina RLTA avoids nearly all ref-
erence to the terms "lessor" or "lessee." A "lessor" is now in-
cluded expressly within the definition of a landlord for purposes
of the RLTA.49 A lessor at common law, therefore, would now be
subject to all of the rights, duties and liabilities of a landlord
under the RLTA, regardless of whether the tenant (the lessee at
common law) has taken actual possession.
Similarly, a tenant for purposes of the RLTA includes any
"person entitled under a rental agreement to occupy a dwelling
unit to the exclusion of others. '50 Thus, a tenant is not only a
person who has made an actual entry, but also is a person with
only a contractual entitlement to occupy the leased premises.
Accordingly, the residential tenant who is denied actual
possession prior to entry is no longer limited to a single remedy
for contract damages. If the landlord fails to deliver actual pos-
session of the dwelling unit at the commencement of the term, a
tenant under a rental agreement subject to the RLTA may "de-
mand performance of the rental agreement" and may maintain
an action for possession against the landlord or any other person
wrongfully in possession. 1
2. The Tenant's Right to Collect Damages
In addition to the action for possession under section 27-40-
620, a tenant may recover actual damages either from the land-
lord in certain circumstances or from any other person wrong-
fully in possession of the premises at the start of the rental
term.52 To the extent that a tenant may recover damages from a
49. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-210(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
50. Id. § 27-40-210(15) (emphasis added).
51. Id. § 27-40-620(a)(2).
52. Id. If failure to deliver possession is wilful and not in good faith, the RLTA
exacts a punitive measure of damages equal to the greater of three months' rent or twice
the actual damages, plus reasonable attorney's fees. Id § 27-40-620(b).
1988]
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landlord for the landlord's failure to deliver actual possession
due to the holding over of a prior tenant, the RLTA adopts a
position similar to the so-called "English Rule," which recog-
nizes a landlord's implied covenant to deliver actual possession.
The traditional rationale for the English Rule requiring that
a landlord deliver actual possession was summarized by the Ne-
braska Supreme Court in 1907. A tenant, the court concluded,
would not
have entered into the lease if he had known at the time that he
could not obtain possession on the [commencement date], but
that he would be compelled to begin a lawsuit .... It is unrea-
sonable to suppose that a man would knowingly contract for a
lawsuit, or take the chance of one.
53
The Nebraska court noted further that the landlord is in the
best position to know whether a prior tenant intends to hold
over and that the facts necessary to sustain an ejectment action
are within the landlord's knowledge, thereby justifying the bur-
den upon him to obtain actual possession for the new tenant.'
The RLTA, however, departs from the English Rule in one
critical respect. Under section 27-40-620(a)(2), if the landlord
has made "reasonable efforts to obtain possession of the prem-
ises," the landlord is not liable for damages, even though he is
unable to deliver possession because of a holdover by a previous
tenant without his consent. The purpose of this exception to
protect landlords acting in good faith is similar to the purpose of
section 6.2 of the Restatement (Second) of Property. The Re-
statement also adopts a form of the English Rule, but with the
proviso that liability is limited to only those situations in which
the landlord "does not act promptly to remove the person and
does not in fact remove him within a reasonable period of
time. 1
5
By requiring that the landlord remove the holdover tenant,
the Restatement preserves the essence of the English Rule,
which is to ensure that the tenant is able to gain actual posses-
sion under the lease from the landlord. Under the South Caro-
lina RLTA, on the other hand, if the landlord's effort to remove
53, Herpolsheimer v. Christopher, 76 Neb. 352, 354, 111 N.W. 359, 360 (1907).
54. Id.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (LANDLORD & TENANT) § 6.2 (1977).
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the holdover tenant is reasonable but unsuccessful, the new ten-
ant is left without actual possession and with only a lawsuit for
possession and damages against the holdover tenant. This result
more nearly compares with that of the "American Rule," which
requires only that a landlord give a legal right to possession, but
not actual possession,56 an approach rejected by the drafters of
the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act5 7 and seem-
ingly rejected in South Carolina by the first sentence of section
27-40-620(a)(2).
The extent to which the exception is allowed to swallow the
general rule of section 27-40-620(a)(2) depends upon the inter-
pretation South Carolina courts will give to a "reasonable ef-
fort." The RLTA makes no attempt to define a reasonable ef-
fort,58 but several possibilities exist.
First, a reasonable effort may be deemed to require the
commencement of formal eviction proceedings against a tenant
when other, lesser efforts have not been successful within a rea-
sonable period of time. The practical effect of this approach
would be to construe section 27-40-620(a)(2) in a manner that
closely resembles the Restatement position. Adjudication of the
ejectment action either would enable the landlord to provide ac-
tual possession to the new tenant within a reasonable time or
would determine that the landlord is unable to provide the legal
right to possession, subjecting him to damages for breach of con-
tract. Moreover, the commencement of an ejectment proceeding
would provide the court and interested parties with a definitive
and easily proven standard of reasonability.
However, the RLTA does not require expressly that the
landlord commence a proceeding for ejectment. Thus, a reasona-
ble effort could be deemed instead to require only some lesser,
unspecified action short of formal ejectment by the landlord.
This approach, however, would provide the court with no defini-
tive standard by which to judge reasonability of effort. This in-
terpretation arguably is less desirable, given the RLTA's stated
56. Under the so-called American Rule, "it is not the duty of the landlord, when the
demised premises are wrongfully held by a third person, to take the necessary steps to
put his lessee into possession." Gardner v. Keteltas, 3 Hill 330, 333 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842).
57. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 4.102, 7B U.LA. 481 (1972).
58. The only express obligation of the landlord relevant to defining a reasonable
effort is the obligation to act in good faith as required by S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-220
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
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objective of simplifying and clarifying the law. Furthermore, if
an unsuccessful effort by the landlord to remove the holdover
tenant is deemed reasonable, then the policy underlying the
English Rule as adopted in the first sentence of section 27-40-
620(a)(2), which requires that the landlord provide actual pos-
session, apparently would be compromised by the practical ef-
fect of the second sentence.
3. Abatement of Rent; Right to Terminate Prior To
Possession
As an alternative to seeking possession and damages upon a
failure by the landlord to deliver possession, a tenant may termi-
nate the rental agreement "upon at least five days' written no-
tice" to the landlord."9 The inclusion of a notice period suggests
that the landlord has a right to cure during that five-day period.
A literal reading of the RLTA, however, again forces the oppo-
site conclusion. The right of the tenant to terminate arises upon
the landlord's failure "to deliver possession. . . as provided in §
27-40-430. ' '60 Section 27-40-430, in turn, requires the delivery of
possession at "the commencement of the term."'" Accordingly,
the tenant's right to terminate, if literally applied, appears to
become absolute upon any failure by the landlord, no matter
how slight, to deliver possession on the commencement date of
the lease. Under such a literal interpretation, the landlord would
have no right to cure. That interpretation, however, is not pref-
erable because it would render essentially meaningless the five-
day notice period provided.
Regardless of the remedy selected by the tenant, the obliga-
tion to pay rent abates in all cases until actual possession is ten-
dered by the landlord.2
59. Id. § 27-40-620(a)(1). The five-day period, similar to all time periods provided
by the RLTA, is calculated by excluding the first day and including the last. If the last
day falls on a Sunday, the period is extended to include the following Monday. See id. §
27-40-240(d) (applying S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976)(repealed 1985)).
Whether this method of calculation was altered by the adoption of S.C.R. Cwv. P. 6, which
replaced § 15-1-20, is unclear since Rule 6 existed at the time of passage of the RLTA
but was not mentioned therein.
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-620(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
61. Id. § 27-40-430.
62. Id. § 27-40-620(a).
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IV. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS ARISING OUT OF THE LANDLORD
AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP
The traditional property law relationship between the land-
lord and tenant imposes upon the landlord only the duty to pro-
vide the tenant with at least a legal right to possession of the
premises during the term. The tenant has a reciprocal duty to
pay rent during the term for so long as the legal right to posses-
sion remains undisturbed.
63
Any additional rights and obligations between the parties at
common law depend solely upon the provisions of the contract
or lease. A tenant's only remedy for the landlord's breach of a
contractual obligation short of a constructive eviction is an ac-
tion in contract for damages.6 4 Insofar as the property law obli-
gations are viewed at common law in South Carolina as separate
and distinct from the contractual obligations, unless the land-
lord expressly agrees otherwise, the tenant's obligation to pay
rent is not dependent upon the landlord's performance of any
contractual duty. Thus, the duty to pay rent under prior law is
essentially absolute once the landlord tenders the legal right to
possession.
The RLTA makes two fundamental changes to the obliga-
tions arising out of the landlord and tenant relationship. First, it
imposes statutory duties of maintenance upon both the land-
lord 5 and tenant6 6 in addition to traditional property or con-
63. See Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); R.
SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT 109 (1980). The property law
theory of constructive eviction significantly modified the common-law duty to pay rent.
If a landlord's failure to maintain the premises in a usable condition disturbs the ten-
ant's possession, then constructive eviction entitles the tenant to vacate and cease paying
rent. See Jaffe-Spindler Co. v. Genesco, Inc., 747 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1984) (applying
South Carolina law); Thomas v. Hancock, 271 S.C. 273, 246 S.E.2d 604 (1978).
64. Rowland & Sons, Inc. v. Bock, 150 S.C. 490, 493, 148 S.E. 549, 550 (1929); see
also Young v. Morrisey, 285 S.C. 236, 239, 329 S.E.2d 426, 428 (1985).
65. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-440 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); infra notes 70-97,
124-27 and accompanying text. If a landlord conveys the premises during the tenancy to
a bona fide purchaser, he is relieved of liability under the rental agreement and the
RLTA for events occurring after he gives written notice of the conveyance to the tenant,
except with regard to the security deposit. If the deposit is transferred to the buyer and
the tenant is notified of the buyer's liability, then the landlord is relieved of any liability
to retain or account for the deposit. A manager is relieved of liability, for events occur-
ring after he gives written notice to the tenant of the termination of his management.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-450 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
66. See id. § 27-40-440; infra notes 153-64 and accompanying text.
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tract obligations; it creates certain rights and obligations regard-
ing landlord access to the dwelling unit;6 and it expressly limits
the tenant's use of the dwelling unit.68 Second, the RLTA statu-
torily links the tenant's obligation to pay rent to the landlord's
continued compliance with contractual and statutory obliga-
tions,"9 thereby eliminating the fundamental distinction that ex-
ists at common law between the property and contractual
relationships.
A. The Duty to Maintain the Premises
1. Landlord Obligation to Maintain Habitability and Code
Compliance
The RLTA adopts the approach of the Uniform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act, which imposes duties upon the land-
lord to maintain the basic structure and systems of the dwelling
unit as well as the common areas.70 The tenant is obligated, in
turn, to keep the dwelling unit safe and clean and to use the
systems in a reasonable manner.71 The nature of these obliga-
tions and, in particular, the remedies provided for their breach
signify a substantial departure from the landlord and tenant re-
lationship under prior law.
The RLTA imposes upon the landlord a duty to the tenant
to comply with all applicable building and housing codes that
materially affect health and safety.72 Furthermore, the landlord
67. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-530 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); see infra notes 204-15
and accompanying text.
68. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-510(7) to -540 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); see also
infra notes 216-26 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 96.119 and accompanying text.
70. The landlord's statutory maintenance obligations during the term of the rental
agreement are set forth in S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-440 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). Section
27-40-430 requires that the landlord also comply with § 27-40-440 at the time the prem-
ises are delivered to the tenant. If he fails to comply, the tenant may refuse to enter and
may assert any of the remedies under § 27-40-620 for the landlord's failure to provide
possession. If the tenant does enter, he still may assert the remedies for breach of § 27-
40-440 as discussed in notes 98-138 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
72. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-440(a)(1)(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). Building and hous-
ing codes are defined as "any law, ordinance, or governmental regulation concerning fit-
ness for habitation, or the construction, maintenance, operation, occupancy, use, or ap-
pearance of any premise, or dwelling unit." Id. § 27-40-210(2).
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is required to make all repairs necessary to keep the premises in
a habitable condition. 3 Common areas must be kept in a reason-
ably safe condition and, if there are more than four dwelling
units on a single premises, the common areas also must be kept
reasonably clean.74
In addition to these general obligations, the RLTA specifi-
cally requires that the landlord provide and maintain in good
and safe working order any appliances or facilities necessary to
provide hot and cold running water and heat. But if the building
is not required by law to be equipped for that purpose or if the
generation of hot water or heat is "by an installation within the
exclusive control of the tenant and supplied by a direct public
utility connection," the landlord is relieved of this obligation. 5
Other systems or appliances supplied by the landlord must be
maintained in reasonably good and safe working order, and
these specifically include sanitary plumbing or sewer services,
electricity, gas, air conditioning, and elevators. 78
South Carolina has refused at common law to recognize any
similar implied warranty of fitness and habitability in leases.
Thus, a tenant not subject to the RLTA "takes leased premises,
in the absence of an express warranty, or of fraud or misrepre-
sentation, in the condition and quality in which they are."'7 8 The
landlord at common law has no duty to make repairs necessary
to keep safe the leased premises, other than the common areas
that remain in the control of the landlord.9
The historical rationale for not imposing such duties of
maintenance and repair upon the landlord lies in the traditional
property law concept of a lease as a sale of the premises for a
73. Id. § 27-40-440(a)(2).
74. Id. § 27-40-440(a)(3).
75. Id. § 27-40-440(a)(4),(5); see also infra note 123.
76. Id. § 27-40-440(a)(5). This section does not require specifically that a landlord
provide air conditioning. If air conditioning is supplied, however, it must be maintained
in reasonably good and safe working order. See Howard v. Simon, 18 Ohio App. 3d 14,
480 N.E.2d 99 (1984). In the rental agreement the landlord may exclude specific appli-
ances, other than those necessary to provide essential services, from the coverage of § 27-
40-440(a)(5).
77. Young v. Morrisey, 285 S.C. 236, 329 S.E.2d 426 (1985); Holmes v. Rosner, 289
S.C. 287, 346 S.E.2d 37 (Ct. App. 1986).
78. Young, 285 S.C. at 241, 329 S.E.2d at 429.
79. Edwards, Inc. v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 505, 510 n.5 (D.S.C.
1978); see Timmons v. Williams Wood Prod. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329 (1932).
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term. Under that approach, "the landlord was considered to
have surrendered both possession and control and he was not
permitted to enter the premises without the consent of the ten-
ant."80 It followed that the landlord had no duty to repair the
premises once the tenant had possession."1
The harshness of the property law rule of caveat emptor as
applied to leases was diminished by recognition of the doctrine
of constructive eviction, which may relieve a tenant of rental ob-
ligations if the premises fall into such disrepair as to constitute
an interference with the tenant's right to possession."2 Contract
law, however, provided the basis for the first complete abroga-
tion of caveat emptor with judicial recognition of an implied
warranty of habitability in Wisconsin in 1961. Relying upon a
perceived change in legislative policy evidenced by the adoption
of housing and building codes, the Wisconsin court in Pines v.
Perssion 3 declared the old property law rule obsolete and im-
posed upon the landlord a duty to deliver the premises "in a
condition reasonably and decently fit for occupation when the
lease term commenced.
'8 4
In Javins v. First National Realty Corp. 5 the District of
Columbia imposed upon the landlord a duty of repair by requir-
ing compliance with the housing code not merely at the com-
mencement of the tenancy, but throughout the term. Since
Javins, most states have adopted an implied warranty either ju-
dicially or legislatively. 8 Jurisdictions differ, however, in their
definitions of habitability. Some states, following the lead of
Pines and Javins, continue to rely upon the local housing code
regulations in defining a warranty against latent defects.
8 7
Others have established that the warranty and housing regula-
80. Note, Personal Injuries to the Tenant; The Landlord's Liability in Tort There-
for, 10 S,C.LQ. 307 (1958).
81. Id.
82. See supra note 63.
83. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
84. Id. at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 413.
85. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
86. A list of jurisdictions adopting an implied warranty of habitability as of 1984 can
be found in Mallor, The Implied Warranty of Habitability and the "Non-Merchant"
Landlord, 22 DuQ. L. REv. 637 (1984).
87. See, e.g., Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 IlM. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972);
Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973).
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tions are not coextensive.88
The RLTA adopts the latter approach, treating compliance
with housing regulations and habitability as separate but related
concepts. Under the RLTA, a landlord must comply at a mini-
mum with applicable codes materially affecting health and
safety.89 A separate provision, however, requires that the prop-
erty be kept in a habitable condition. 0 This provision suggests
that habitability may extend beyond minimum health and safety
code compliance, but, in the absence of a more specific statutory
definition, the exact parameters of habitability are left for judi-
cial determination."
The landlord and tenant of a single family residence may
agree in writing to shift to the tenant the duty to perform under
section 27-40-440(a)(5), as well as the duty to perform other spe-
cific repairs, maintenance tasks, alterations and remodeling. The
agreement must be entered into "in good faith and not for the
purpose of evading the obligations of the landlord. ' '92 The land-
lord and tenant of a dwelling unit other than a single family res-
idence also may agree that the tenant will perform certain speci-
fied repairs, maintenance tasks, alterations, or remodeling, but
only if the agreement is entered into in good faith and not for
the purpose of evading the obligations of the landlord, the agree-
ment does not affect the obligations of the landlord to other te-
nants on the premises, and the work is not necessary to cure
88. See, e.g., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972); Boston Hous. Auth. v.
Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 200 n.16, 293 N.E.2d 831, 844 n.16 (1973); Berzito v. Gam-
bino, 63 N.J. 460, 470, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973).
89. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-440(a)(1), (b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
90. Id. § 27-40-440(a)(2).
91. Other states recognizing an implied warranty of habitability either judicially or
by statute have considered various factors in addition to housing code compliance as
indicative of habitability. Hawaii has left the determination of habitability to be made
on a case-by-case basis with "both the seriousness of the claimed defect and the length
of time for which it persists" as relevant factors. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 436, 462
P.2d 470, 476 (1969). Likewise, Iowa courts have listed seven relevant factors in addition
to code compliance, including the nature of the defect, the age of the structure, and the
amount of rent paid. Mease, 200 N.W.2d at 797. Some states, such as Florida, in its
version of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, require specific minimal
conditions in place of a general requirement of habitability, including the absence of
vermin, removal of garbage, provision of heat in winter, and provision of running water
or hot water. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.51(2)(a) (West Supp. 1986); see WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 59.18.060 (Supp. 1986).
92. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-440(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
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noncompliance with applicable codes as required under section
27-40-440(a)(1).93
The requirement that a landlord may not shift the burden
of performance for the purpose of evading his obligations is an
enigma. Any shift of a statutory duty may be interpreted as be-
ing for the proscribed purpose of evading statutory obligations.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws included identical language in the uniform version of the
act as approved in 1972, and the language appears in the law of
a number of states that adopted the uniform version shortly
thereafter. The uniform version, however, was amended to de-
lete the words "and not for the purpose of evading the obliga-
tions of the landlord. 9 4 By not following the amended version of
the uniform act, South Carolina has introduced uncertainty re-
garding when an attempt to shift duties will be enforced. At
best, the statutory language may be interpreted loosely to re-
quire only that the landlord act in good faith.95 Even that inter-
93. Id. § 27-40-440(d). In the case of a single-family dwelling unit, the RLTA ex-
pressly permits the landlord to shift to the tenant by contract the duties imposed under
§ 27-40-440(a)(5), as well as other specified duties to repair. The absence of a similar
expressed reference in § 27-40-440(d) to the duties imposed by subsection (a)(5) leaves
room for an argument that the drafters did not intend for the landlord to shift those
statutory duties to the tenant other than in the single-family residence situation. On the
other hand, by expressly restricting the power of the landlord to shift the burden of
repairs necessary to comply with § 27-40-440(a)(1), § 27-40-440(d)(2) suggests by nega-
tive inference that the landlord may shift to the tenant duties imposed by other
paragraphs of § 27-40-440(a). See generally Davis, URLTA, Kansas, and the Common
Law, 21 U. KAN. L. REV. 387, 408-09 (1973).
94. Following publication of a critique of the original version of the Uniform Resi-
dential Landlord and Tenant Act by a subcommittee of the American Bar Association,
see Proposed Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 8 REAL PROP. PROB. & Ta.
J. 104 (1973), amendments were approved to facilitate endorsement of the Act in 1974 by
the American Bar Association. See Report of Vice President, Proceedings of the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Special Committee on Uni-
form Landlord Tenant Relationship Act, 1974 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 177. The text of the amendments is pub-
lished in The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act: Some Suggestions for
Improvement, 9 REAL PROP. PROB. & Ta. J. 402, 410 (1974). Both Iowa, which adopted
the uniform version most recently prior to South Carolina, and Rhode Island, which has
since adopted the uniform version, used the amended language, omitting any reference
to evasion of obligations. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 562A.15(2) & (3)(a) (West Supp. 1987);
R.L GEN. LAWS § 34-18-22 (Supp. 1987).
95. In commenting on similar language in the Nebraska Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act, Professor Kalish concluded that "any shift in obligation will be made for the
purpose of evading the obligation. The word 'evading' connotes, however, the shift of
obligation unfairly or in bad faith, and the statute ought to be construed in this way."
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pretation, however, seems inadequate since a similar require-
ment already is imposed elsewhere by the RLTA.
In drafting section 27-40-440(d), pertaining to units other
than single family residences, the legislature omitted a require-
ment in the uniform version that the agreement shifting the bur-
den be in writing and separate from the rental agreement. How-
ever, given the requirement of a writing with regard to
assumption of repairs by a tenant of a single family residence,
such a writing also should be prepared in other cases as a matter
of good practice.
2. Tenant Remedies for Breach by Landlord of Obligations
to Maintain
A significant aspect of the development of the implied war-
ranty of habitability is that the covenant to pay rent and the
warranty of habitability are mutually dependent. Thus, in states
recognizing the warranty, the tenant's duty to pay rent no longer
is independent of other covenants as under traditional property
law principles, but is conditioned upon the landlord's continued
compliance with duties imposed under the warranty.96 The
RLTA fully embraces the mutual dependency of covenants, es-
tablishing that a tenant's obligations under a rental agreement
are dependent upon not only the landlord's compliance with
statutory obligations, but also upon the landlord's material com-
pliance with express contractual obligations. A noncompliance
by the landlord may create several options for the tenant.
First, if a breach is material to the rental agreement or vio-
lates section 27-40-440 in a manner that materially affects
health and safety, the tenant may terminate the rental agree-
ment if timely repairs are not made by the landlord. 7 Second, if
Kalish, The Nebraska Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 54 NEB. L. REv. 603, 645
(1975). The American Bar Association subcommittee studying the uniform version in
1973 observed that "it is far from clear as to which sort of work can actually be per-
formed by the tenant" under the provisions permitting the parties to shift obligations.
Proposed Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, supra note 94, at 112.
96. See Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 596, 111 N.W.2d 409, 413 (1961).
97. S.C. Cona. ANN. § 27-40-610(a)(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). However, a tenant may
not terminate under this section if the condition was caused by the deliberate or negli-
gent act or omission of the tenant, a family member of the tenant, or other person al-
lowed on the premises by the tenant. Id. § 27-40-610(a)(2). By implication, termination
may be an available remedy even if the conditions are caused by one of these persons, so
19881
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the breach does not enable a tenant to terminate, or if the ten-
ant elects not to terminate, then the tenant may bring an action
to recover damages or seek injunctive relief.9 The RLTA also
appears to permit a tenant to bring an action for damages in
addition to termination, but the omission from the RLTA of a
provision included in the uniform version clarifying the cumula-
tive nature of the remedies casts some doubt upon that interpre-
tation. 19 Third, a tenant who does not terminate the rental
agreement may withhold rent during the period of noncompli-
ance and wait for the landlord to initiate an action for posses-
sion or for rent. The tenant then may assert the landlord's non-
compliance as a defense or counterclaim to that action.100
Finally, alternative remedies exist if the landlord's noncompli-
ance concerns an essential service as defined under the RLTA. 101
(a) Termination. The general tenant remedies provision 1 2
of the RLTA permits a tenant to terminate the rental agreement
if the landlord does not properly cure a breach of any obligation
under section 27-40-440 that materially affects health and safety
or the physical condition of the premises. A material breach by
the landlord of any additional contractual obligation under the
rental agreement that is not cured in a timely manner also per-
mits the tenant to terminate under section 27-40-610. The ten-
ant may commence the statutory cure period by delivering writ-
ten notice to the landlord that the rental agreement will
terminate on a specified date, not less than fourteen days later,
if specified breaches are not remedied.1 03 If the identified breach
affects health and safety, the rental agreement terminates on the
date specified in the notice, unless the landlord adequately rem-
long as his actions are not deliberate or negligent. See S. Andrews, Landlord Obligations
and Tenant Remedies 10 (June 21, 1986)(Continuing Legal Education Seminar).
98. SC. CODE ANN. § 27-40-610(b)(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). No provision expressly
prohibits a tenant from seeking damages if the landlord's noncompliance is caused by
the tenant's own deliberate or negligent acts. However, no likelihood of a windfall to the
tenant seems to exist in such a situation, since the landlord presumably could then re-
cover damages of an equal or greater amount for the tenant's breach of § 27-40-510(6).
99. See infra Part IV(A)(2)(b).
100. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-640 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); see also infra notes 111-
19 and accompanying text.
101. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-630 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
102. Id. § 27-40-610; see also infra notes 174-85 and accompanying text regarding
tenant's separate remedies for fire and casualty damage.
103. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-610(a)(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
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edies the breach within fourteen days. 1' 4 If the breach does not
affect health and safety, the remedy must be commenced within
fourteen days and completed within that time if possible. If the
remedy of such a breach not affecting health and safety cannot
be completed within that fourteen-day period, it must be "pur-
sued in good faith to completion within a reasonable time" in
order to prevent termination. 10 5
The "materiality" standard, which appears in several con-
texts in connection with the obligations and remedies of the par-
ties, lends itself to imprecision.10 6 The materiality requirements
prevent the tenant from terminating the rental agreement for
mere technical breaches by the landlord.107 One commentator
suggests that the standard used to determine whether a breach
materially affects health and safety should be the same standard
used to determine whether a breach renders the premises unin-
habitable.10 8 The perceived advantage of enunciating such a def-
inition of materiality, rather than relying upon a case-by-case
104. Id. § 27-40-610(a)(1)(i). The requirement that a landlord need only "ade-
quately" remedy a breach to forestall termination suggests that a full remedy is not re-
quired. It may not necessarily follow, however, that, because less than a full remedy is
required, incomplete repairs by the landlord are sufficient. For example, if electrical wir-
ing does not conform to a code and presents a material safety hazard, the landlord may
be required to repair the wiring fully to prevent termination. The repairs, however, may
not constitute the tenant's full legal remedy. The landlord also may be subject to a ten-
ant's claim for damages resulting from the breach of the duty to maintain. To the extent
that the landlord has not paid damages to the tenant, a full remedy may not have been
effected by the repairs. Nevertheless, completion of the repair work removes the tenant's
need to terminate to avoid the safety hazard and, thus, should be an adequate remedy to
forestall termination. Arguably, the adequacy requirement contemplates this kind of sit-
uation and is not intended to be used to justify incomplete repairs.
105. Id. § 27-40-610(a)(1)(ii). The statutory language reads "if such remedy ...
cannot be remedied within fourteen days." Presumably the drafters intended to say "if
such remedy cannot be completed within fourteen days." Given the imprecision associ-
ated with determining a reasonable passage of time in a particular situation, a tenant in
this position may find it advisable to seek a judicial determination of his rights prior to
attempting to terminate and vacating.
106. See id. §§ 27-40-440(a) (landlord must comply with codes materially affecting
health and safety), 27-40-510(1) (tenant must comply with codes materially affecting
health and safety), 27-40-610 (remedy for material noncompliance by landlord with
rental agreement or noncompliance with RLTA materially affecting health and safety),
and 27-40-710 (remedy for noncompliance with RLTA by tenant materially affecting
health and safety).
107. But see id. § 27-40-710 (permitting landlord to terminate for any uncured
breach of the rental agreement).
108. Comment, Interpreting the Attorneys' Fees and Materiality Provisions of the
Iowa Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 65 IowA L. REV. 1074 (1980).
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development, is a reduction of the uncertainty inherent in the
case-by-case approach that forces landlords and tenants to pre-
dict whether a breach will be found to be of sufficient magnitude
to entitle the tenant to terminate. While such certainty is gener-
ally a desirable objective of the RLTA, determining the materi-
ality of a breach solely by its effect upon habitability would sub-
stantively alter the availability of the termination remedy.
Assuming that a purpose of the termination remedy is, at
least, to permit a tenant to seek safer or more habitable condi-
tions when necessary, any act or omission of the landlord ren-
dering the premises uninhabitable under section 27-40-440(a)(2)
or rendering common areas unsafe under section 27-40-440(a)(3)
would seem, indeed, to justify the finding of a material effect
upon health and safety or the physical condition of the premises.
The habitability standard, however, may not in all circum-
stances provide a sufficiently comprehensive definition of mate-
riality for applying the termination remedy.
For example, the landlord's noncompliance with applicable
codes under section 27-40-440(a)(1) should by definition materi-
ally affect either health and safety and should entitle the tenant
to terminate after the proper cure period expires. Such noncom-
pliance, however, may not necessarily render the premises unin-
habitable. Section 27-40-440(b) recognizes that the duty of the
landlord to comply with all applicable building and housing
codes materially affecting health and safety under subsection
(a)(1) may exceed the duty to maintain the premises in a habita-
ble condition under subsection (a)(2). Thus, the legislature has
determined that materiality is not necessarily coextensive with
habitability in considering the effect upon health and safety of a
noncompliance under section 27-40-440.
Likewise, the effect upon habitability is an inadequate mea-
sure of the materiality of a breach of the rental agreement.
While a breach rendering the premises uninhabitable may in-
deed be viewed as material, other breaches may be equally mate-
rial to the tenant. For instance, a landlord may breach an ex-
press covenant to install air conditioning after the start of the
lease. The tenant may consider the breach material, but it is un-
likely that such a breach would be deemed to render the prem-
[Vol. 39
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ises uninhabitable.0 9
The most appropriate method for determining the material-
ity of such a breach depends upon the primary function assigned
to the RLTA. If the objective of the statute were narrowly con-
strued as being limited to the establishment of a minimum ac-
ceptable quality level for rental housing, then it might be appro-
priate to judge the materiality of a breach simply by its effect
upon habitability. Under this view, a tenant would have a right
to terminate the rental agreement only when the breach would
render the premises below the minimally acceptable statutory
standard of habitability. If the objective of the statute is more
broadly construed, however, to establish the predominance of
the contractual nature of the landlord and tenant relationship,
then it is appropriate to judge the materiality of a breach by its
effect upon the essential agreements of the contracting parties.
The latter view better comports with the expressed scope of
section 27-40-610, which does not limit the termination remedy
solely to breaches of section 27-40-440(a)(2). Such a limitation of
the remedy to breaches of section 27-40-440(a)(2) would be ap-
propriate if the effect upon habitability were intended to be the
sole standard of materiality. Rather, the materiality of a breach
of the rental agreement should depend upon whether the breach
defeats an essential expectation of the parties. Under this view,
the failure of a landlord to comply with an express covenant to
provide air conditioning, for example, might reach the essence of
the rental agreement and constitute a material breach, at least if
the air conditioning is not provided during the summer months.
Similarly, whether noncompliance with an applicable code has a
material effect on health and safety may depend upon the facts
of a case, such as the seriousness of any potential illness or in-
jury, the likelihood of its occurrence, the immediacy of the risk,
or any combination of these or other relevant factors.
(b) Damages. The materiality of a breach is not a factor in
an action by a tenant for damages under section 27-40-610(b).
The tenant may recover actual damages and obtain injunctive
relief for any noncompliance by the landlord with the terms of
either the rental agreement or section 27-40-440. This remedy is
the traditional contract remedy for the landlord's breach of the
109. But see Park Hill Terrace Assocs. v. Glennon, 146 N.J. Super. 271, 369 A.2d
938(1977).
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rental agreement, applied equally to a breach of the additional
statutory obligations imposed by the RLTA.
The absence in the RLTA of any express requirement that a
tenant elect between the remedies of termination and damages
suggests that the remedies should be cumulative in nature. This
result would be consistent with section 4.101(b) of the Uniform
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act upon which section 27-40-
610(b) is based. The legislature, however, did not include in the
RLTA a section equivalent to section 4.101(c) of the uniform
version which clarifies that the remedies are cumulative. Land-
lords may argue that the omission is indicative of a legislative
intent not to make the remedies cumulative. While such a view
is plausible, the better view would seem to be that the legisla-
ture intended merely to delete an explanatory section of the uni-
form act and not to require that the tenant elect between reme-
dies, especially given the direction of section 27-40-50(a) that
remedies "must be so administered that an aggrieved party may
recover appropriate damages."''
(c) Withholding Rent. Both of the remedies set forth in sec-
tion 27-40-610 have shortcomings for the typical residential ten-
ant. Termination requires that the tenant seek immediate hous-
ing elsewhere, and an action to recover damages requires that
the tenant incur the time and cost of a legal proceeding. More-
over, to some extent, both remedies existed under prior law.""
Thus, perhaps the most beneficial aspect to the tenant of the
RLTA's treatment of the landlord's maintenance obligations and
the tenant's rental obligation as mutually dependent covenants
is the implicit creation of a right of the tenant to withhold rent
in an appropriate amount until a breach is cured.
Section 27-40-640 permits a tenant to raise the landlord's
noncompliance, if any, with the rental agreement or the provi-
sions of the RLTA as a defense or counterclaim in an action by
the landlord for rent or possession. Thus, the tenant implicitly
may withhold rent in the amount of any monetary damages suf-
fered from such a breach by the landlord without having to initi-
110. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-50(a)(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
111. The RLTA substantially expands the right of a tenant to terminate the rental
agreement. But at common law, if a constructive eviction occurred, the tenant could va-
cate and terminate. A tenant also, of course, has an action at common law for damages
arising from breach of contract.
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ate legal proceedings.
This course of action by the tenant, however, is subject to
an important limitation. If the landlord is alleged not to have
complied with his duties to maintain the premises under the
rental agreement or under section 27-40-440, the tenant may as-
sert this noncompliance as a defense or counterclaim only if the
landlord received proper notice of the alleged violation before
the rent was due.112 The landlord must have actual knowledge or
reason to know that the violation 113 exists or he must receive
notice of the violation at least fourteen days before rent is due,
unless the landlord violates a provision of essential services. The
tenant's notice of an essential services violation must be calcu-
lated to give the landlord a reasonable opportunity to make
emergency repairs before the rent is due.
If the landlord does not have sufficient notice, the tenant
will be deemed to have waived noncompliance as a defense and,
therefore, may not withhold the rent under section 27-40-640. If
the tenant does withhold rent under these circumstances and is
held to have asserted a defense or counterclaim other than in
good faith in a subsequent action for possession or rent, the
landlord may recover attorney's fees."'
Once the landlord commences an action for possession and a
rule to show cause has been issued, the tenant is required to pay
to the landlord any accrued rent, plus rent that becomes due
after the issuance of a rule to show cause or to vacate. The ten-
ant then may pursue a counterclaim against the landlord to re-
cover any damages allegedly incurred as a result of the land-
lord's breach. The tenant must pay all amounts allegedly owed
for the period prior to issuance of the rule, except for periods
the tenant was not in possession of the dwelling unit." 5 How-
ever, if the tenant alleges a violation by the landlord of the
rental agreement or of the RLTA, then the amount of rent due
after the rule is not the contract rental amount, but the fair
112. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-640(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). Notice is defined in §
27-40-240(a).
113. The RLTA requires notice under § 27-40-640(b)(1) only for violations of § 27-
40-440. However, since subsection (b) also generally applies to violations of maintenance
obligations under the rental agreement, the legislature probably intended to include
those violations as well under subsection (b)(1); the omission appears inadvertent.
114. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-640(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
115. Id. § 27-40-790.
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market rental value of the premises at the time of the hearing.1 "
Unlike the uniform version which provides for payment into
the court,117 the RLTA contemplates payment directly to the
landlord. Failure to pay the required amounts will result in the
issuance of a warrant of ejectment."" On the other hand, if the
landlord alleges that the tenant owes more rent than is actually
due as determined at the hearing, judgment must be entered for
the tenant if he has complied with section 27-40-790."1
3. A Landlord's Obligation to Maintain Essential Services
and Tenant Remedies for Breach Thereof
In addition to the general obligations of the landlord to
maintain the dwelling unit in accordance with appropriate codes
and in a habitable condition, section 27-40-440(a)(4) and (5) im-
poses obligations upon the landlord to provide and maintain
particular services.2 The RLTA further delineates certain of
these services as "essential services" and provides alternative
remedies to the tenant if the landlord wrongfully fails to provide
or wilfully diminishes an essential service.' 2 '
Unlike the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act,
under which any service can be deemed essential on the facts of
a particular case,' 22 the South Carolina RLTA limits the number
of services that are treated as essential. The essential services
are:
sanitary plumbing or sewer services; electricity; gas, where it is
used for heat, hot water, or cooking; running water, and rea-
sonable amounts of hot water and heat, except where the
building that includes the dwelling unit is not required by law
116. Id. § 27-40-790(a). Fair market rental value is defined in § 27-40-210(4).
117. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 4.105, 7B U.LA 485 (1972).
118. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-790(c) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1987).
119. Id. § 27-40-790(d).
120. Id. § 27-40-440(a)(4), (5).
121. Id. § 27-40-210(17).
122. See Austin v. Danford, 62 Or. App. 242, 660 P.2d 698, modified on other
grounds, 63 Or. App. 334, 663 P.2d 802 (1983). The uniform version does not separately
define an essential service. However, reference is made throughout to "heat, running
water, hot water, electric, gas, or other essential service," which indicates that the ser-
vices specified are only examples of essential services and not an exclusive listing. UN!F.
RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT §§ 4.104(a), 4.107, 4.207, 7B U.L.A. 483-98
(1985).
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to be equipped for that purpose, or the dwelling unit is so con-
structed that heat or hot water is generated by an installation
within the exclusive control of the tenant and supplied by a
direct public utility connection. '23
The RLTA expressly requires that the landlord provide
running water at all times, as well as reasonable amounts of hot
water and heat, subject to the same limitations as are set forth
in the definition of an essential service.12 4 The RLTA does not
expressly require the landlord to provide other electrical and gas
services, beyond the amount needed to supply heat and hot
water, and sanitation service, although these services are defined
as essential in nature. The landlord, however, may need to pro-
vide each of these services to comply with either applicable gov-
ernment codes, standards of habitability, or the rental
agreement.
To the extent that any provision of either the RLTA or the
rental agreement requires the landlord to provide an essential
service, he must also maintain the facilities and appliances in a
reasonably good and safe working condition necessary to provide
that service. 25 If the landlord negligently or wilfully breaches
that obligation to provide the service, the tenant may elect, in
lieu of the general remedies under section 27-40-610, to procure
reasonable amounts of the essential service and deduct the ac-
tual and reasonable cost of the procurements from future rent."2"
123. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-210(17) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). The first exception
of hot water and heat from the definition of an essential service, when the dwelling unit
is not required by law to be equipped for that purpose, is ambiguous. The New Mexico
Supreme Court, interpreting a similar provision in that state's law construed the excep-
tion as "placing the burden upon the owner to show that a law exists which exempts him
from providing reasonable heat for the resident." T.W.I.W., Inc. v. Rhudy, 96 N.M. 354,
357, 630 P.2d 753, 756 (1981)(rejecting argument that tenant must show existence of law
requiring heat); see also Lovell, The Iowa Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act and the Iowa Mobile Home Parks Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 31 DRAKE
L. REv. 253, 321-322 (1981). The second part of the exception, which pertains to situa-
tions in which the installation is in the tenant's control, has been described as "the typi-
cal arrangement in the single-family residence rental. The exception would appear to
absolve the landlord from all liability should, for instance, the gas company fail to pro-
vide gas necessary to run the tenant's furnace." Id. at 322.
124. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-440(a)(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
125. Id. § 27-40-440 (a)(5).
126. Id. § 27-40-630. In the alternative, a tenant may elect to sue under this section
to recover damages, measured by the difference between the contract rental price and
the fair market rental value without the essential service, plus attorney's fees. Id. § 27-
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If the landlord wilfully interrupts or causes the interruption of
an essential service, the tenant also may elect to terminate and
seek punitive damages from the landlord under section 27-40-
660.127
One apparent objective of the procure and deduct remedy
provided under section 27-40-630 is to provide the tenant with a
means to obtain promptly certain services legislatively deemed
essential to residential habitation. The tenant, however, may use
the remedy only if certain procedural steps and substantive con-
ditions are satisfied. To procure and deduct under section 27-40-
630, the tenant, before procuring the services needed, must give
written notice to the landlord of the breach12 and wait a reason-
able time thereafter for the landlord to act.129 If the landlord
fails to act, the tenant then may procure the service, but he may
deduct the cost of the services procured only if the landlord was
at least negligent in failing to provide the essential services.'30
Moreover, the right to procure services does not give a tenant
the right to make repairs to the premises and deduct the cost.31
Thus, in effect the RLTA permits a tenant to procure services
only on a temporary basis but not to make repairs, such as to a
furnace or hot water heater, that may be necessary to procure
the services permanently.
The theoretical basis for imposing a prohibition under the
RLTA against a tenant making repairs and deducting the cost is
not clear. At common law, a landlord had no duty to repair areas
under the control of the tenant absent an express covenant to do
so. It followed that, in the absence of such a covenant, a tenant
should not be allowed to circumvent the purpose of that rule by
accomplishing the repairs himself and charging the cost to the
40-630(a)(2).
127. Id. § 27-40-660.
128. Id. § 27-40-630(a).
129. Id. § 27-40-630(d). The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act has no
similar requirement that the tenant wait for a reasonable time before acting, although it
does require prior notice to the landlord. The tenant has no right under the RLTA to
procure and deduct the cost of essential services if the tenant, a member of the tenant's
family, or other person allowed on the premises by the tenant causes the condition by a
negligent or deliberate act or omission.
130. Id. § 27-40-630(a).
131. Id. § 27-40-630(c). Also, any mechanic's lien arising from unlawful repairs is
unenforceable. Id.
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landlord.132 The RLTA, however, abolishes the common-law pre-
mise upon which the no repair and deduct rule was based. A
landlord now has an affirmative duty imposed by law under sec-
tion 27-40-440 to maintain the premises, including the mainte-
nance of certain essential services, during the term of the rental
agreement.
The prohibition set forth in section 27-40-630(c) against re-
pairing and deducting does protect a landlord from a tenant
making extensive repairs, such as the installation of a new fur-
nace, without the approval of the landlord and then charging the
costs of those repairs against future rent. Rather than refusing
to recognize the repair and deduct remedy altogether, the Uni-
form Residential Landlord and Tenant Act addresses this con-
cern by placing a very modest limit on the amount that may be
deducted by the tenant.1 13 South Carolina, however, permits no
such deduction.134 Unfortunately, the result of this apparent at-
tempt to compromise between the interests of the landlord and
of the tenant by permitting some procurement, but no repair, of
services provides little comfort to either party, as illustrated by
several simple but not uncommon examples.
Consider the situation, for instance, in which an elderly ten-
ant awakens on a subfreezing morning to find that there is no
heat in the dwelling unit. Although a life-threatening situation
may exist, to take advantage of section 27-40-630, the tenant
first must deliver written notice to the landlord and then wait a
reasonable time for the landlord to restore the heat. If the land-
lord fails to act, the tenant may obtain heat from another
source, such as by purchasing a space heater. But the tenant
cannot be assured that he will be able to deduct the cost of that
132. See Cantrell v. Fowler, 32 S.C. 589 (1890). The status of the right to repair and
deduct at common law is less certain when a landlord's express covenant to repair is
breached. See Bruton, Landlord and Tenant in South Carolina, 1 S.C.L.Q. 119, 126, 127
n.8 (1948). This right never has been expressly recognized in South Carolina in that
circumstance, but its existence has been suggested by dicta in Cantrell, 32 S.C. at 590
and in Timmons v. Williams Wood Prod. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329 (1932). To the
extent that § 27-40-630(c) simply clarifies that the RLTA does not create a right to re-
pair and deduct, arguably it does not preclude the recognition of such a right at common
law. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987) ("Unless displaced by the
provisions of this chapter, the principles of law and equity . . . shall supplement the
provisions of this chapter.").
133. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT § 4.103, 7B U.LA. 481 (1985).
134. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-630(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
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heater absent a legal determination that the landlord has been
at least negligent in failing to provide heat. In this instance, the
burdens imposed by section 27-40-630 fall primarily upon the
tenant and appear to contradict both the expressed general pur-
pose of the RLTA-to simplify landlord and tenant law-and
the specific purpose of section 27-40-630-to permit a tenant to
obtain essential services quickly when needed.
The effort to limit the exposure of landlords under section
27-40-630, however, may have undesired negative effects on their
interests. For example, a blockage in a sewer line leading from
the premises may cause raw sewage to overflow into several
dwelling units on the premises. Even if the landlord fails to re-
spond within a reasonable time after written notification of the
problem, the tenants apparently cannot contract with a sewer
cleaner to have the blockage removed in a relatively simple and
inexpensive manner and then deduct that cost from their rent.
Such a treatment would be a nondeductible repair rather than a
procurement. Each tenant, however, might contract for the de-
livery and use of a portable toilet facility, possibly with the right
to deduct the cost of that facility from future rent.135 As a result,
the ultimate cost to the landlord could be substantially in-
creased, and each tenant still would be forced, if he elected not
to terminate, to live with the uncorrected problem of overflowing
sewage in the dwelling units.
While section 27-40-630 provides a remedy for the land-
lord's negligent failure to provide essential services at any time,
even at the commencement of the term, section 27-40-660 ap-
plies only if the landlord initially provides service but later
wilfully interrupts or causes the interruption of an essential ser-
vice. 136 The tenant then may terminate the rental agreement
and recover damages equal to the greater of three months rent
or twice the actual damages, plus reasonable attorney's fees. 13
This section may be construed to provide punitive damages only
if the rental agreement is terminated pursuant to section 27-40-
135. As in the previous example, the tenants would not be assured of their right to
deduct this cost without both knowing the cause of the blockage and making a legal
determination that the landlord had been at least negligent.
136. A wilful act is defined as an attempt intentionally to avoid obligations under
the rental agreement or the RLTA. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-210(16) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1987).
137. Id. § 27-40-660.
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660. However, the comment to the Uniform Residential Land-
lord and Tenant Act section 4.101, from which South Carolina
derived section 27-40-630, indicates that the section 27-40-660
remedy should be construed as an additional remedy to the sec-
tion 27-40-630 remedies. Since procurement and termination are
essentially inconsistent remedies not likely to be jointly utilized,
this comment to the uniform act suggests that in the event of a
wilful interruption of services a tenant should be able to procure
services under section 27-40-630 and recover double damages
under section 27-40-660, even if there is no termination of the
rental agreement.13
4. The Effect of Maintenance Obligations upon the Tort
Liability of Landlord for Personal Injuries to Tenants on the
Premises
Landlords generally have enjoyed broad protection under
South Carolina law against tort claims for personal injuries suf-
fered by a tenant on the leased premises, other than in areas
under the direct control of the landlord. The RLTA does not
expressly purport to alter the common-law limitations on tort
liability. By its creation of statutory obligations upon the land-
lord to maintain the dwelling unit during the tenancy, however,
the RLTA arguably does provide a new basis for extending the
tort liability of a landlord well beyond prior limitations.
The South Carolina Supreme Court consistently has refused
to broaden tort liability of a landlord for injuries to a tenant
except in a few select circumstances. As recently as 1985 the
court reaffirmed the general rule that, even when the landlord
expressly has covenanted to repair, "a failure to make repairs
will give rise merely to a right of action for breach of contract
under which damages are not recoverable for personal injuries
sustained by reason of the defective condition of the
premises."39
138. See Davis, supra note 93, at 414.
139. Young v. Morrisey, 285 S.C. 236, 239, 329 S.E.2d 426, 428 (1985); see also
Bruton, supra note 132, at 124. Landlords have been held liable for injuries resulting
from their negligent performance of work once they have undertaken the work. See Con-
ner v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 243 S.C. 132, 132 S.E.2d 385 (1963). They also have
been held liable for injuries incurred on a part of the premises remaining within the
landlord's control. See cases cited infra note 144.
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The fundamental premise of this rule has been that "the
relationship of landlord and tenant, of itself alone, imposes no
duty upon the former to repair '140 the leased premises and that
any obligation to repair "'must be[] imposed by some contract
apart from the mere lease of the land.' ,,141 Given the premise
under prior law that any duty to repair must be contractual, the
court has rejected an action in tort on the grounds "that action-
able negligence is the neglect to perform a legal duty, as distin-
guished from the failure to perform a mere contractual duty."" 2
Recovery for personal injuries under a contract theory also has
been rejected on the rationale that these injuries are too remote
"to have been within contemplation of the contracting parties
when the contract was entered into."1 43
This rule, however, does not necessarily preclude the recog-
nition of tort liability for injuries caused by the breach of a legal
obligation imposed by the RLTA. The fundamental premise
under prior law that any duty to repair must be contractual in
origin no longer is valid in the residential situation because the
landlord must maintain the dwelling unit according to section
27-40-440. The question raised by the enactment of the RLTA is
whether in South Carolina, as a result of the imposition of these
legal obligations, a tenant may assert an action in tort against
the landlord for injuries resulting from the breach of such
obligations.
A landlord is liable at common law to a tenant injured as a
proximate result of the landlord's negligence when the injury oc-
curs on a part of the premises within the landlord's management
and control.14 4 The distinction drawn by the court between that
situation and situations in which tort liability has been rejected
is that, "[b]ecause possession and control are reserved unto the
lessor, the law implies an obligation, creates a legal duty, to keep
the same in repair, and to operate it properly."'1 45 This language
suggests that possession and control are significant only insofar
140. Timmons v. Williams Wood Prod. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 366, 162 S.E. 329, 330
(1932).
141. Id. (quoting Williams v. Salmond, 79 S.C. 459, 460, 61 S.E. 79, 79 (1908)).
142. Sheppard v. Nienow, 254 S.C. 44, 49, 173 S.E.2d 343, 345 (1970).
143. Timmons, 164 S.C. at 370, 162 S.E. at 332.
144. See Binnicker v. Adden, 204 S.C. 487, 30 S.E.2d 142 (1944); Timmons, 164 S.C.
361, 162 S.E. 329; Medlock v. McAlister, 120 S.C. 65, 112 S.E. 436 (1922).
145. Timmons, 164 S.C. at 374, 162 S.E. at 33.
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as they give rise to a legal duty on the part of the landlord to
repair; the existence of that legal duty is actually determinative
of tort liability.
The significance to a landlord's tort liability of the existence
of a legal duty to repair is underscored by dicta in the leading
South Carolina case Timmons v. Williams Wood Products
Corp.14 Reviewing the exceptions at common law to the general
rule against landlord tort liability, the court concluded that
"with rare exceptions, all of the cases which permit recovery for
personal injuries to the tenant, or to a member of his family, are
bottomed" upon one of six factors, the first of which is "breach
of a statutory duty.1 4 7 Thus, it would appear that a tenant
might properly assert the breach of a statutory duty under sec-
tion 27-40-440 as the basis for tort recovery against his landlord,
regardless of whether the landlord has possession and control of
the defective portion of the premises.
Despite a common-law tradition of protecting landlords
from tort liability similar to that in South Carolina, the Ohio
Supreme Court held that tort liability does arise from the land-
lord's breach of a provision in the Ohio residential landlord and
tenant act 145 similar to section 27-40-440 of the South Carolina
RLTA. In Shroades v. Rental Homes, Inc.1 49 the Ohio court held
that a landlord's violation of the obligation to maintain the
dwelling unit in a habitable condition is negligence per se. This
ruling overturned an earlier decision of that court 150 which had
refused to recognize such a tort remedy in the absence of clear
legislative direction to do so.
Like the Ohio statute, the RLTA creates specific statutory
duties of the landlord intended to protect the tenant from un-
healthy and unsafe conditions. Even in the absence of an ex-
pressed legislative intent to provide a remedy in tort for a
breach of those duties, the imposition of the duties arguably has
removed the "underpinnings of the common law rules" protect-
146. 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329 (1932).
147. Id. at 374, 162 S.E. at 333.
148. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(A) (Anderson 1981).
149. 68 Ohio St. 2d 20, 427 N.E.2d 774 (1981).
150. The court overturned its earlier decision in Thrash v. Hill, 63 Ohio St. 2d 178,
407 N.E.2d 495 (1980), in which the court had refused to recognize any extension of tort
liability beyond the common-law principles.
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ing landlords from tort liability to the tenant.151 Moreover, rec-
ognition of tort liability based upon a breach of the statutory
warranty of habitability would be consistent with the recent im-
plied recognition by the South Carolina Court of Appeals in
Holmes v. Rosner 52 of an action for personal injury arising from
a landlord's breach of an express warranty of habitability.
5. Tenant Obligations to Maintain Premises
(a) Under Prior Law. Few South Carolina decisions prior to
the RLTA have addressed the condition in which the tenant is
obligated to return the leased premises at the end of the term.
To the extent that the issue has been considered, it generally
has been in an agrarian setting and has been expressed in terms
of the tenant's duty not to commit voluntary waste by removing
timber or other natural resources belonging to the holder of the
reversionary interest.153 Although prior South Carolina law has
not expressly defined the tenant's legal duty to repair or main-
tain an urban, residential premises, that duty logically would be
predicated upon the same obligation to avoid waste.
Application of principles regarding waste in the urban, resi-
dential setting suggests that a tenant is not required under prior
law to repair damage incurred as a result of ordinary wear and
tear during the tenancy.
Whether particular acts or omissions constitute waste de-
pends on matters of fact, including: the nature, purpose, and
duration of the tenancy; the character of the property; whether
the acts complained of are related to the use and enjoyment of
the property; whether the use is reasonable in the circum-
151. Id. at 184, 407 N.E.2d at 499 (Sweeney, J. dissenting). If tort liability is based
solely on a theory of negligence per se arising from a breach of the landlord's statutory
obligations to the tenant, an interesting question remains whether that liability extends
also to claims made by family or guests of the tenant.
152. 289 S.C. 287, 346 S.E.2d 37 (Ct. App. 1986).
153. See Dial v. Gardner, 104 S.C. 456, 89 S.E. 396 (1916) (landlord has claim
against tenant in possession for injuries to land affecting reversion); Roberts v. Jones, 71
S.C. 404, 51 S.E. 240 (1905) (removal of manure belonging to landlord is waste); Lewis v.
Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 69 S.C. 364, 48 S.E. 280 (1904) (tenants liable for cut tim-
ber); Wingard v. Lee, 287 S.C. 57, 336 S.E.2d 498 (Ct. App. 1985) (cutting of timber held
not to be waste on facts); see also City Council v. Moorhead, 31 S.C.L.(2 Rich.) 430
(1846) (agreement by tenant to return premises in same order as when received imposes
upon tenant a contractual duty to repair even usual wear and tear and decay).
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stances; and whether the acts complained of are reasonably
necessary to effectuate such use.'"
On the other hand, the duty to avoid waste in South Carolina
includes the duty to avoid permissive as well as voluntary waste.
"Waste may be committed by acts or omissions which tend to
the lasting destruction, deterioration, or material alteration of
the freehold and the improvements thereto or which diminish
the permanent value of the inheritance." '155 A tenant, thus, may
have a duty at common law in South Carolina to make whatever
minor repairs may be necessary to prevent a greater permanent
harm from occurring.
(b) Under the RLTA. The RLTA shifts to the landlord cer-
tain affirmative duties to repair the premises and clarifies the
extent to which a residential tenant remains responsible for
maintenance of the leased premises.156 The maintenance duties
imposed upon the tenant are, for the most part, complementary
to duties imposed upon the landlord under section 27-40-440. As
the landlord has a duty to the tenant to comply with applicable
government codes, the tenant now is obligated to comply with
all duties primarily imposed upon tenants by applicable building
and housing codes materially affecting health and safety.15
Complementing the landlord's duty to keep common areas safe
is the tenant's duty to keep the dwelling unit and other parts of
the premises used by the tenant reasonably safe and clean.' 58
The tenant also is responsible for keeping all plumbing fix-
tures clean 59 and for using in a reasonable manner all facilities
and appliances supplied by the landlord.' The tenant must re-
move trash from the dwelling unit in a reasonably clean man-
ner1 6' and may not deliberately or negligently destroy, deface,
damage, or remove a part of the premises or knowingly permit
154. Wingard, 287 S.C. at 60, 336 S.E.2d at 500.
155. Id. (emphasis added).
156. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-510 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
157. Id. § 27-40-510(1).
158. Id. § 27-40-510(2). The landlord has an analogous obligation to keep common
areas reasonably clean only if five or more dwelling units are on the premises. Id. § 27-
40-440(a)(3).
159. Id. § 27-40-510(4).
160. Id. § 27-40-510(5).
161. Id. § 27-40-510(3).
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another to do so. 16 2 This latter obligation thereby incorporates
into the RLTA the common-law prohibition against voluntary
waste by the tenant.
In addition to these express statutory obligations, section
27-40-510 obligates the tenant to comply with the provisions of
the rental agreement, 6 3 including any rules and regulations im-
posed by the landlord pursuant to section 27-40-520.1" Thus,
the RLTA, in effect, incorporates into section 27-40-510 by ref-
erence all the provisions of the rental agreement and the rules
and regulations, including any maintenance obligations imposed
by agreement upon the tenant and any assumption by the ten-
ant of repair obligations normally imposed upon the landlord
under section 27-40-440.
6. Landlord Remedies for Breach by Tenant of Obligations
to Maintain
(a) Termination. In contrast to the limitation placed upon
the tenant's termination remedy for a landlord's breach of the
rental agreement, no express materiality standard is imposed on
a tenant's breach of the rental agreement. Any noncompliance
by the tenant under the rental agreement permits the landlord
to terminate the agreement, if the noncompliance is not cured
within the statutory period.0 5
The landlord's termination remedy under section 27-40-710
also is available if the tenant fails to comply with any obligation
under section 27-40-510 in a manner that materially affects
health and safety or the physical condition of the property. 6
The absence of a materiality standard regarding a breach of the
rental agreement, however, may provide the landlord with an
opportunity to circumvent the requirement that statutory non-
compliance must have a material effect for the landlord to ter-
minate. By incorporating the section 27-40-510 duties into the
rental agreement, the landlord can make any noncompliance
with the statutory obligations a breach of the rental agreement,
162. Id. § 27-40-510(6).
163. Although § 27-40-510(8) requires compliance with the "lease," the term "rental
agreement" should have been used for consistency with the rest of the RLTA.
164. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-510(8) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
165. Id. § 27-40-710(a). /
166. Id.
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regardless of the effect upon health and safety or physical condi-
tion of the premises. That breach of the rental agreement, if not
timely cured, would be sufficient to permit termination without
inquiry into the issue of materiality.
The termination procedure under section 27-40-710, requir-
ing that the landlord notify the tenant in writing of specific
noncompliances and provide the tenant with fourteen days to
cure or begin to cure the noncompliances, parallels the proce-
dure for termination available to the tenant under section 27-40-
610. The landlord, however, may have a second termination rem-
edy under section 27-40-720(b) in certain emergency situations.
If a tenant's noncompliance with section 27-40-510 materially
affects health and safety and cannot be remedied by repair, re-
placement of a damaged item, or cleaning, then in the case of an
emergency the landlord may terminate without giving fourteen
days notice if the tenant fails to cure the noncompliance "as
promptly as conditions require. 1 7 Although section 27-40-720
on its face applies only to a noncompliance with section 27-40-
510, all of the terms of the rental agreement are incorporated by
reference into that section through section 27-40-510(8).
(b) Self-help. If the tenant fails to remedy his noncompli-
ance with maintenance obligations in a timely manner, the land-
lord is permitted in certain circumstances to undertake the re-
pairs himself"68 and recover their cost in an action against the
tenant for damages. If a noncompliance with section 27-40-510e9
materially affects health and safety and can be remedied by re-
pair, replacement of a damaged item, or cleaning, the landlord
may be permitted to enter and have the work performed in a
workmanlike manner. This remedy is available only if the land-
lord first provides notice to the tenant of the breach and re-
quests that it be remedied. If the tenant then fails to comply
within fourteen days or, in the case of an emergency, as quickly
167. Id. § 27-40-720(b). This section further provides that if a noncompliance occurs
in a nonemergency situation, the landlord may terminate if the tenant does not cure the
noncompliance within 14 days after written notice from the landlord specifying the
breach. Because this provision provides relief already available under § 27-40-710(a), its
purpose is not readily apparent.
168. Id. § 27-40-720(a).
169. Included again is any noncompliance with the rental agreement as incorporated
through § 27-40-510(8).
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as conditions require, the landlord may act.1 70
The self-help remedy is in addition to any other remedies
available to the landlord.1 7 ' Thus, the landlord still may elect to
terminate the rental agreement,17 2 and he may bring an action to
recover actual damages incurred as a result of the tenant's fail-
ure to comply.17 3 Such damages should include the cost of the
repairs undertaken by the landlord.
(c) Damages. The landlord retains under section 27-40-
710(c) the right to recover actual damages and to obtain injunc-
tive relief for any noncompliance with the rental agreement or
section 27-40-510. The remedy is similar to that provided to te-
nants under section 27-40-610(c), including a provision for the
award of attorney's fees if noncompliance by the tenant is wilful.
The cumulative nature of the landlord's remedy for dam-
ages, however, is more certain than the tenant's remedy. Section
27-40-750 establishes that following termination and an action
for possession the tenant retains a separate claim for actual
damages for breach of the rental agreement. The RLTA does not
expressly state whether he also retains a separate claim for dam-
ages arising from a breach of statutory obligations. A landlord,
therefore, is well-advised to incorporate the terms of section 27-
40-510 into the rental agreement to ensure that he can recover
all actual damages in addition to termination.
B. The Rental Obligation
1. Abatement of Rent Following Destruction of Premises
The RLTA expands upon and clarifies the tenant's right to
terminate the rental agreement or to continue it at a reduced
rent if normal use and occupancy of the dwelling unit is sub-
stantially impaired by fire or casualty. The tenant may vacate
the premises immediately and terminate the rental agreement as
170. Id. § 27-40-720(a).
171. Id.
172. A question to be resolved is whether the landlord can terminate under § 27-40-
710 if, in an emergency situation, he exercises his power under § 27-40-720(a) and repairs
the defect prior to expiration of 14 days. Section 27-40-710 provides that the tenant
must have 14 days to cure before the landlord can terminate; it makes no exception for
emergency situations.
173. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-710(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
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of the date of vacating if he notifies the landlord in writing
within seven days thereafter of his intent to terminate. 74
If continued occupancy is lawful, the tenant may elect to
vacate only that part of the premises rendered unusable. If the
tenant vacates only a portion of the premises, future rent is re-
duced in proportion to the diminution in fair market rental
value.175 In other words, if the casualty or fire reduces the fair
market rental value of the premises by twenty-five percent, the
rent owed under the rental agreement will be reduced by that
same percentage.
At early common law, strict adherence to the property law
concept of a lease as a conveyance resulted in a tenant's being
held liable for rent even after the destruction of the premises by
fire or other casualty. 17 6 South Carolina, however, has long inter-
preted the common law to reach a result more consistent with
modern expectations. As early as 1792, the court held that a ten-
ant was not required to pay for the time he was denied enjoy-
ment of the leased premises by the casualties of war.177 In 1828,
in Ripley v. Wightman,7 1 the court considered English com-
mon-law decisions that were cited for the proposition that a ten-
ant bears the cost of premises destroyed by a storm. The court
concluded that, although the tenant was required to pay rent
because of principles of independent covenants, he was not
barred by those decisions from recovering damages incurred. 1
79
The Supreme Court of South Carolina extensively consid-
ered the issue again in 1871 in Coogan v. Parker.'80 The court
stated the general rule in South Carolina as derived from the
earlier cases that when there is "a substantial destruction of the
subject-matter [of a lease] .. .by an act of God, or of public
enemies, tahe tenant may elect to rescind, and on surrendering
all benefit thereunder shall be discharged from the payment of
rent."'' Thus, the destruction of a building by an act of God or
a public enemy could give rise to termination of the lease if the
174. Id. § 27-40-650(a)(1).
175. Id. § 27-40-650(a)(2).
176. See R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 63, at 660.
177. Bayly v. Lawrence, 1 S.C.L.(1 Bay) 499 (1792).
178. 15 S.C.L.(4 McCord) 447 (1828).
179. Id. at 450.
180. 2 S.C. 255 (1871).
181. Id. at 259.
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building "were the main element of the consideration on which
the agreement to pay rent was based."1 82 Dictum in Coogan,
however, suggested that the doctrine of termination may not ex-
tend under South Carolina common law to the destruction of the
leased premises by fire, unless the parties agree differently by
contract.183
The RLTA clarifies the tenant's rights in three situations.
First, if the dwelling unit is partially destroyed and the tenant
gives timely notice, the rental agreement is terminated. Second,
if the dwelling unit is partially destroyed and the tenant does
not give timely notice of an intent to terminate, the rental obli-
gation continues at a reduced rate. Third, if the dwelling unit is
totally destroyed and the tenant gives timely notice, the rental
agreement is terminated. Section 27-40-650, however, does not
expressly address a fourth situation in which the premises are
totally destroyed, but the tenant fails to give notice of an intent
to terminate within seven days.
In the absence of an agreement between the parties, the re-
sult in the fourth situation depends upon whether section 27-40-
650 is interpreted to condition the right to terminate upon the
tenant giving notice within seven days. If timely notice were
construed as a condition precedent to any termination under
section 27-40-650, the remedy in the absence of notice after the
premises are totally destroyed would depend upon whether that
section is intended to provide the only remedies available to the
tenant in the event of a fire or casualty. If so, the tenant appar-
ently would have no remedy and would remain liable for the en-
tire rental obligation, absent a breach by the landlord of some
other obligation under the RLTA or rental agreement."8 4 Thus,
the tenant who failed to terminate within seven days might pay
more for a premises totally destroyed by casualty than for a
premises only partially destroyed. Moreover, he might be re-
quired to pay more than would have been required at common
law, a result apparently not intended by the inclusion of section
182. See id. at 275.
183. See id. at 265.
184. Rent could not be abated under § 27-40-650(a)(2) in the event of total destruc-
tion since continued lawful occupancy would not be possible. A question might be raised
regarding whether the landlord's repair obligations include reconstruction of substan-
tially destroyed premises. If so, a refusal by the landlord to repair might then allow the
tenant to terminate under § 27-40-610 instead.
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27-40-650.
If section 27-40-650 is not exclusive and if the RLTA is in-
terpreted not to provide any remedy in the absence of timely
notice, then common-law principles should continue to govern
the tenant's obligations in the fourth situation.185 If at common
law the tenant were required to continue to pay full rent, how-
ever, an incongruous result again would be reached: the tenant
would have to pay more rent if the premises were totally de-
stroyed, than under the RLTA if the premises were only par-
tially destroyed. If, on the other hand, the tenant were allowed
to terminate at common law even though he had not given the
notice to terminate required by the RLTA, the seven-day notice
provision under the RLTA would be rendered meaningless when
the premises were totally destroyed.
These results suggest that the purpose of the RLTA to
modernize landlord and tenant law is best served by construing
section 27-40-650 to provide a remedy in all situations. Under
this interpretation, when continued occupancy of a dwelling unit
would be unlawful after a fire or other casualty, a failure by the
tenant to notify the landlord within seven days of his intent to
terminate would not foreclose the right to terminate under sec-
tion 27-40-650. Rather, the failure to give timely notice would
merely prevent the tenant from taking advantage of the provi-
sion that the termination is retroactive to the date of vacating.
Thus, if the tenant did not provide timely notice, he would have
a remedy of termination under the RLTA, but would remain lia-
ble for full rent for the period up to the date of the actual notifi-
cation. Only under this approach does the RLTA fully achieve
the apparent intent of section 27-40-650 to protect a tenant
from bearing the risk of the premises being destroyed.
2. Landlord Remedies for Tenant Breach of Rental
Obligation
If the tenant fails to pay rent when due and if the breach is
not cured in a timely manner, the landlord may terminate the
rental agreement under section 27-40-710(b), commence an ac-
tion for damages under section 27-40-710(c), or both. The land-
185. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
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lord also retains under the RLTA the power to collect rent by
distraint procedures available under existing statutory law.186 In
an action for possession following termination or in a proceeding
for rent or for distraint, the tenant may raise any defenses to
payment available under the RLTA or rental agreement. 187
Under prior South Carolina law, a residential landlord could
commence an action for possession upon any failure by the ten-
ant to pay rent when due. 88 The RLTA invokes a five-day grace
period, permitting termination of the rental agreement and com-
mencement of an action for possession only if the rent remains
unpaid five days after the due date. 89 To terminate a rental
agreement for nonpayment of rent, the landlord also must give
the tenant prior written notice of nonpayment and of the land-
lord's intent to terminate if the rent is not paid within the grace
period."'0
Section 27-40-710(b) leaves ambiguous the time within
which the landlord must provide notice. By merely requiring no-
tice prior to termination, one interpretation is that the RLTA
permits landlords to provide notice immediately prior to such
termination. It seems more likely, however, that the intent of
the RLTA is to require notice at the beginning of the grace pe-
riod, as does the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act.191
This ambiguity may prove unimportant in practice because
additional provisions of section 27-40-710(b) require a landlord
to give such notice only once during the term of a rental agree-
ment and, more importantly, permit him to satisfy the notice
requirement by including it in conspicuous language in the writ-
ten rental agreement. The entire notice provision under the
RLTA approach, therefore, may prove to be of little practical
benefit to tenants.
A second remedy of the landlord is an action for damages
under section 27-40-710(c). If nonpayment of rent is found not
to have been in good faith, the landlord may recover attorney's
186. Id. § 27-40-740(b).
187. Id. § § 27-40-640(a), -740(b).
188. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-37-10(a) (Law. Co-op. 1977).
189. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-710(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
190. Id.
191. UNIW. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 4.201(b), 7B U.L.A. 492 (1972).
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fees in addition to actual damages.' 9' A landlord may bring an
action under this section at any time prior to or following termi-
nation,193 and, because distraint is available only to recover rent,
this action is particularly appropriate when actual damages in
addition to unpaid rent are sought.
The third remedy arising under the RLTA for the tenant's
failure to pay rent is the right of the landlord to enforce collec-
tion by distraint and sale of the tenant's property." Although
the remedy has been criticized for various reasons195 and is abol-
ished by the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act,
196
the South Carolina version retains the landlord's authority to
use the procedures set forth in sections 27-39-210 to -360.
The RLTA does clarify the applicability of the general ex-
emption statute9" to distraint proceedings in residential tenan-
cies. Under prior law, only personal clothing, food, bedding, and
cooking utensils of the tenant were expressly exempt from dis-
traint.198 The court of appeals recently indicated, without decid-
ing, that the general exemption statute might not supplement
these exemptions. 99 Under the RLTA, however, the tenant may
claim the exemptions of section 15-41-200 in a distraint proceed-
ing,200 including exemptions of not more than $2500 in aggregate
value of household furnishings, household goods, wearing ap-
parel, appliances, books, animals, crops, or musical instruments,
of not more than $500 in jewelry, and of not more than $1200 in
one motor vehicle.20 '
Except for this modification and the recognition of addi-
tional tenant defenses under the RLTA and rental agreement,
the RLTA incorporates intact the prior law of distraint. Thus,
192. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-710(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
193. See id. § 27-40-750.
194. Id. § 27-40-740(b).
195. See authorities cited in Spitz, supra note 27, at 816.
196. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT § 4.205(b), 7B U.L.A. 497 (1985).
197. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-200 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
198. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-39-230 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
199. See Howard v. Bibbs, 287 S.C. 636, 639 n.1, 340 S.E.2d 566, 568 n.1 (Ct. App.
1986); 1983 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. 161.
200. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-740(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). By making the ex-
emptions under § 15-41-200 available to a tenant, the RLTA appears to supplement, not
replace, the exemptions under § 27-39-230. Thus, if the latter are more favorable to the
tenant, such as when clothing and bedding exceed a value of $2500, he may continue to
assert them.
201. Id. § 15-41-200.
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the remedy should be available whenever the relationship of
landlord and tenant exists, the rent is in arrears and of a sum
certain, and the landlord's claim is for rent only.20 2 Problems
under the prior law in the procedures and enforcement of the
remedy, however, also remain. These problems include uncer-
tainty regarding the extent of the sheriff's power to enter the
premises forcibly if necessary to distrain the personal property
of the tenant and the constitutionality of the statutory require-
ment that a tenant post a double bond in order to prevent a sale
of the distrained property.
20 3
C. The Landlord's Right of Access to the Dwelling Unit
Common-law treatment of a lease as a conveyance gave a
landlord no right of access during the term of the tenancy.
204
Although this basic rule may survive, the formulation of the
landlord's right of access under the RLTA subjects the rule to a
broad range of exceptions intended to permit a landlord to pro-
tect his interest in the property and to fulfill his modern obliga-
tions of repair. The landlord now may gain access to the dwell-
ing unit when permitted by the RLTA or by court order, when
accompanied by a law enforcement officer at a reasonable time
to serve process in ejectment proceedings, or following abandon-
ment or surrender of the dwelling unit by the tenant.2 05
A landlord may enter the dwelling unit at any time with the
consent of the tenant. The tenant may not unreasonably with-
hold consent under the RLTA if the landlord gives twenty-four
hours notice of his intent to enter at a reasonable time to inspect
the premises, make repairs or improvements, provide services, or
show the dwelling unit to workmen or to persons with a prospec-
tive or actual interest in the dwelling unit.
208
The tenant's consent is not required for entry in an emer-
gency, which is defined to include a prospective change in
202. See Frady v. Smith, 247 S.C. 353, 147 S.E.2d 412 (1966); Burnett v. Boukedes,
240 S.C. 144, 125 S.E.2d 10 (1962); Fidelity Trust & Mort. Co. v. Davis, 158 S.C. 400, 155
S.E. 622 (1930).
203. For a more complete analysis of the distraint remedy in South Carolina and of
the problems it presents, see Spitz, supra note 27, at 815-26.
204. See Note, supra note 80, at 307.
205. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-530 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
206. Id. § 27-40-530(a).
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weather that poses a likelihood of danger to the property."' If
the written rental agreement conspicuously permits the landlord
to enter for regularly scheduled services and he gives prior no-
tice of his intent to enter, he may enter without the tenant's
consent to perform those services between the hours of 9 a.m.
and 6 p.m. 08 If the tenant requests that services be provided
and the landlord gives prior notice of his intent to enter, he may
do so for that purpose between the hours of 8 a.m. and 8 p.m.209
The landlord may exercise his right to enter under section
27-40-720 without the tenant's consent to repair defects caused
by the tenant's noncompliance that the tenant has not repaired.
Except in an emergency, however, in which case the landlord has
immediate access under section 27-40-530(b)(1), a landlord exer-
cising the right to enter under section 27-40-720 may be subject
to the restriction of section 27-40-530(c) that he give twenty-
four hours notice and enter only at a reasonable time.
The application of subsection 27-40-530(c) to entry under
section 27-40-720 is not entirely clear. Section 27-40-530 con-
templates two separate sources of a right to access. A right may
arise under section 27-40-530(a) or (b), as limited by subsection
(c), or the right may arise elsewhere and be cross-referenced
within section 27-40-530(d). The question is whether the restric-
tions imposed by subsection (c) also apply to limit the rights
cross-referenced in subsection (d).
Subsection (c) ostensibly applies "except in cases under
item (b) above,"21 suggesting, perhaps, a broader application
than merely to cases of entry by consent under subsection (a).
Application of the notice requirements to the exercise of all ac-
cess rights enumerated in subsection (d), on the other hand,
would seem to require, for instance, that a landlord provide
twenty-four hours notice of his intent to enter to serve process
in an ejectment action. This unusual result suggests that some
clarification of the applicability of the notice requirement under
section 27-40-530(c) is needed.
The landlord may terminate the rental agreement or obtain
207. Id. § 27-40-530(b)(1). A landlord may enter the dwelling unit, for instance, if
entry is necessary to secure plumbing against a sudden freeze.
208. Id. § 27-40-530(b)(2).
209. Id. § 27-40-530(b)(3).
210. Id. § 27-40-530(c).
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injunctive relief to compel access if the tenant refuses to permit
lawful access.211 In addition, the landlord may recover actual
damages and attorney's fees.212 The inclusion of injunctive relief
indicates that, when consent is required for entry and the tenant
refuses, the landlord may not resort to self-help, but must seek
judicial relief before entering, even if the consent is withheld
unreasonably.
The landlord, on the other hand, may not abuse the right of
access or use it to harass the tenant.213 If the landlord enters
unlawfully, repeatedly enters lawfully but unreasonably, or re-
peatedly demands lawful entry to the extent that the tenant is
harassed unreasonably, then the tenant may seek injunctive re-
lief or terminate the rental agreement.214 In addition, the tenant
may recover actual damages and attorney's fees.215
D. Permitted Uses of the Dwelling Unit
The RLTA sets forth three express restrictions upon the use
of a dwelling unit by the tenant. First, the dwelling unit must be
used only as a dwelling unit, unless otherwise agreed.21 ' This
statutory restriction reverses the rule of construction applied
under prior law that "in the absence of an exclusion of other
purposes, a lease for a specific purpose will be regarded as per-
missive instead of restrictive and does not limit the use of the
premises by the lessee to such purposes. '21 7 Second, the dwelling
unit may not be used for any illegal purpose,21 8 which codifies an
implied condition of a tenancy recognized in some states at com-
mon law.219
The RLTA does not specify a remedy for breach of either of
these two use restrictions. In the absence of a specific statutory
211. Id. § 27-40-780(a).
212. Id.
213. Id. § 27-40-530(c).
214. Id. § 27-40-780(b).
215. Id.
216, Id. § 27-40-540.
217. Chassereau v. Stuckey, 288 S.C. 368, 370, 342 S.E.2d 623, 624 (Ct. App. 1986).
The position adopted under the RLTA has been described as "consistent with the nor-
mal expectations of the parties in the modern residential environment." Kalish, supra
note 95, at 669.
218. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-540 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
219. See, e.g., Saad v. Hatfield, 258 Ky. 525, 80 S.W.2d 583 (1935).
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remedy, the courts must fashion an appropriate remedy that will
give effect to the obligation imposed. Damages or injunctive re-
lief appear to be particularly appropriate remedies in this situa-
tion. Whether termination of the rental agreement by the land-
lord also should be permitted is more troublesome. Injunctive
relief without a right of termination may sufficiently protect the
landlord's interests. Moreover, although the remedy of termina-
tion frequently is available for breach under the RLTA, it is not
universal and is not available, for instance, upon most breaches
of the tenant's analogous obligation under the RLTA not to use
the premises in a manner that disturbs other tenants.
The third restriction on a tenant's use is the obligation
under section 27-40-510(7) not to disturb the other tenant's
peaceful enjoyment of the premises. For a breach of that obliga-
tion, a landlord may seek damages and injunctive relief under
section 27-40-710(c). The landlord might also terminate the
rental agreement under section 27-40-710(a) if such a breach
materially affects health and safety or the physical condition of
the premises and is not cured in a timely manner. But, as a
practical matter, any disturbance having that effect would likely
violate other subsections of section 27-40-510, and this overlap
eliminates the need to rely solely upon subsection (7) as a
ground for termination.
The obligation imposed under section 27-40-510(7) runs
only to the landlord and not to other tenants who may be dis-
turbed by the offending tenant. A tenant, therefore, has no right
under the RLTA to enjoin directly another tenant for disturbing
the peaceful enjoyment of the premises. Nor does a tenant have
any explicit claim under the RLTA against his landlord for fail-
ure of the landlord to control another tenant. A tenant, however,
is not necessarily without any remedy against a landlord who
fails to enforce section 27-40-510(7) against another tenant.
At common law, the mere existence of a landlord and tenant
relationship generally did not create a landlord's duty to a ten-
ant to control the conduct of other tenants 2 Courts, however,
have recognized the landlord's implied covenant of quiet enjoy-
ment to each tenant.221 Relying upon that covenant, some juris-
220. See Blackett v. Olanoff, 371 Mass. 714, 717, 358 N.E.2d 817, 819 (1977); R.
SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 63, at 104.
221. See, e.g., Gardner v. Jones, 464 So. 2d 1144 (Miss. 1985); Andrews & Knowles
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dictions have held that, if a landlord has the power from any
source to control a disorderly tenant, a failure to exercise that
control may constitute a breach of his implied covenant of quiet
enjoyment to the other tenants, and this breach may result in
constructive eviction of these other tenants.222 A statutory grant
of authority to evict a disorderly tenant has given rise to a find-
ing of a landlord's requisite control to support a defense of con-
structive eviction.223
South Carolina common law implicitly has recognized a cov-
enant of quiet enjoyment by adoption of the defense of con-
structive eviction in other circumstances. 24 To the extent that
such a covenant is not inconsistent with the provisions of the
RLTA, it should survive and supplement the landlord's obliga-
tions imposed by the RLTA and the express terms of the rental
agreement.225 Indeed, such a covenant seems consistent with the
apparent purpose of section 27-40-510(7) to ensure peaceful en-
joyment of the premises.
With continued recognition of the covenant of quiet enjoy-
ment as an implied term of the rental agreement, the statutory
grant of power to the landlord to control a disorderly tenant
may be sufficient to create a right of action by another tenant
against the landlord. Relying upon common-law principles rec-
ognized in other jurisdictions, a South Carolina tenant suffi-
ciently disturbed by another tenant may be able to assert the
remedies provided in section 27-40-610 against the landlord on
the grounds that the landlord's failure to exercise his power
under the RLTA to control the disturbance constitutes a breach
of his implied obligations under the rental agreement.22
Produce Co. v. Currin, 243 N.C. 131, 90 S.E.2d 228 (1955); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Beas-
ley, 215 Va. 348, 210 S.E.2d 151 (1974).
222. See Blackett v. Olanoff, 371 Mass. 714, 358 N.E.2d 817 (1977); Eskanos & Sup-
perstein v. Irwin, 637 P.2d 403 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981); Gottdiener v. Mailhot, 179 N.J.
Super. 286, 431 A.2d 851 (1981).
223. Gottdeiner, 179 N.J. Super. at 292, 431 A.2d at 854.
224. See Thomas v. Hancock, 271 S.C. 273, 275, 246 S.E.2d 604, 605 (1978) ("a con-
structive eviction results from an intentional act or omission of the landlord ... that
deprives the tenant of possession or substantially interferes with his beneficial use or
enjoyment of the leased premises.") (emphasis added).
225. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987) ("Unless displaced by
the provisions of this chapter, the principles of law and equity, including the law relating
to . . . real property . . . shall supplement the provisions of this chapter.").
226. See Kalish, supra note 95, at 657-58.
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E. Landlord's Duty to Mitigate and Right to Terminate
Upon Tenant's Abandonment of Possession During the Term
of the Rental Agreement
Upon a tenant's abandonment of possession of the dwelling
unit during the term of the rental agreement, a landlord has two
options. He may attempt to mitigate damages by making a rea-
sonable effort to relet the dwelling unit at fair value, or he may
terminate the rental agreement as of the date he receives notice
of the abandonment.227
If the landlord elects the first option, the tenant's obligation
to pay rent continues until the earlier of the expiration of the
term or the reletting of the premises. In this situation, if the
rental agreement provides for a month-to-month or week-to-
week tenancy, the term of the rental agreement after abandon-
ment is for only a single month or week period, and the tenancy
is not renewed automatically.
2 28
Failure to pursue the first option automatically causes ter-
mination of the rental agreement as of the date the landlord re-
ceives notice of abandonment. Similarly, acceptance of the aban-
donment as a surrender terminates the rental agreement as of
the date of such notice.229 If the landlord elects immediate ter-
mination, the tenant's obligation to pay rent ceases at that time,
leaving the landlord with only a breach of contract action for
actual damages. Moreover, the landlord remains subject to the
general duty to mitigate if he intends to seek recovery of dam-
ages.230 On the other hand, under the first option, the landlord
may bring an action either for actual damages or for rent ac-
crued after abandonment but prior to reletting.
The landlord's express duty under the RLTA to mitigate
damages retains the rule set forth in earlier South Carolina
cases 23 1 that a landlord may not remain idle following an aban-
donment and continue to demand rent for the remainder of the
term. The RLTA also makes clear that a mere abandonment
without some form of consent or acceptance by the landlord is
227. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 27-40-730(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See id. § 27-40-50(a).
231. See United States Rubber Co. v. White Tire Co., 231 S.C. 84, 97 S.E.2d 403
(1956); Burkhalter v. Townsend, 139 S.C. 324, 138 S.E. 34 (1927).
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not an automatic termination of the rental agreement.23 2 The
RLTA's treatment of every reletting as a termination, however,
modifies prior law that a landlord could relet the premises for
the original tenant's account without terminating the first land-
lord and tenant relationship."' In practice;" though, the signifi-
cance of this change likely will be slight.
23 4
232. Section 27-35-150 provides that "[w]hen a tenant abandons premises ... the
landlord may enter and take possession thereof... and the term of a tenant aban-
doning premises... shall be deemed ended by such abandonment." S.C. CODE ANN. §
27-35-150 (Law. Co-op. 1977). The result in Surety Realty Corp. v. Asmer, 249 S.C. 114,
153 S.E.2d 125 (1967), suggests, without directly deciding, that this language of § 27-35-
150 should not be interpreted to mean that a lease automatically is terminated when the
tenant vacates. Rather, the landlord then has an option to terminate, exercisable only by
some consent or acceptance on the landlord's part. See also Bruton, supra note 132, at
135. That interpretation of § 27-35-150 would be consistent with both the Restatement
view and the approach adopted under the RLTA.
233. The prior rule in South Carolina, as stated in Surety, 249 S.C. at 119, 153
S.E.2d at 128, has been that, upon abandonment and default by the tenant, if the land-
lord re-entered and relet the premises "for his own purposes," the lease was terminated.
However, a landlord could accept the keys to leased premises that had been vacated "so
as to be able to rent the premises for the account of the lessee." Id. Acceptance of the
keys under those circumstances would not terminate the lease or release the tenant from
his rental obligation. Implicit in the recognition that a landlord may relet the premises
"for the account of the lessee" is the principle that reletting under those circumstances
does not terminate the original tenant's rental obligation.
234. Under prior law, the landlord did not have a right to double recovery, since
rent paid by the new tenant was applied to the account of the original tenant. The land-
lord's advantage of reletting on the account of the original tenant was that, since the
original lease was not terminated, the original tenant remained at least secondarily liable
for rent. If the second tenant also defaulted, the landlord retained a claim for rent
against the original tenant, who was treated in essence as a sublessor for the duration of
the original term. Of course, the landlord also retained a contract action against the
original tenant for damages arising from breach.
The action for rent became especially important if the landlord had pursued an ac-
tion for damages against the first tenant prior to the second default. Res judicata pre-
vented the landlord from recovery in a second contract action against the first tenant.
The landlord, however, still could pursue a property law claim for rent that had become
due after the date of the first action. The RLTA precludes this option since any reletting
terminates the rental agreement. Given the short term of most residential rental agree-
ments, however, the likelihood of a second tenant abandoning during the original term is
small. Also, because of the short term, a single action for the initial breach usually will
provide the landlord with recovery sufficient to make a second action unnecessary.
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V. RIGHTS UPON CESSATION OF LANDLORD AND TENANT
RELATIONSHIP
A. Landlord Rights and Obligations Following Abandonment,
Termination, or Expiration of the Rental Agreement
1. The Right to Recover Possession
A landlord may recover possession of the dwelling unit from
a tenant230 only upon the tenant's abandonment of possession or
following termination or expiration of the rental agreement.3 If
the tenant does not relinquish possession voluntarily following
termination or expiration of the rental agreement, the landlord
may commence an action in ejectment under sections 27-37-10
to -160, 28  subject to any defenses raised by the tenant pursuant
to the RLTA.25 8
235. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-770(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987) authorizes an action
against a tenant who remains in possession after termination or expiration of a rental
agreement. Section 27-40-430 permits a landlord also to recover possession and damages
from "any person wrongfully in possession." Id. § 27-40-430. The comment to the UNIF.
RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT § 2.103, 7B ULA. 429 (1972) which is identical
to § 27-40-430, interprets this language as permitting a landlord to proceed against a
squatter. Thus, the existence of a landlord and tenant relationship between the parties
may not always be required in order for an owner to assert rights against another person
under the RLTA.
236. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-760 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). The RLTA retains the
language of S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-35-150 (Law. Co-op. 1976) which defines abandonment
to include the "unexplained absence of a tenant from a dwelling unit for a period of
fifteen days after default in the payment of rent" S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-730(a) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1987). A "default" was not interpreted under prior law, but may have in-
cluded any failure to pay rent when due. The RLTA's use of that term, however, is more
problematic. For a further discussion of that point, see infra text accompanying notes
272-75.
An event set forth in the rental agreement or the exercise of a statutory right to
terminate held by either party may cause termination. The landlord has the option to
terminate in appropriate circumstances under S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-40-710, -720(b), -
730, and -780(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). The tenant may terminate in appropriate
circumstances under §§ 27-40-610, -620, -650, -660, and -780(b). For further discussion of
the availability of the termination remedy, see Part IV of this Article. Section 27-40-760
also permits the landlord to recover possession upon a surrender. That proviso, however,
adds little, since either an abandonment or termination likely will accompany every sur-
render, and either one already provides sufficient grounds to recover possession.
237. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-770(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
238. For example, a tenant may defend under § 27-40-910 on the grounds that the
landlord refused to renew in retaliation for protected conduct of the tenant. See infra
notes 270-75 and accompanying text.
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As under prior law,2 35 if the landlord unlawfully removes or
excludes the tenant at any other time, he is liable to the tenant
for damages. The RLTA awards punitive damages in each in-
stance, but limits the measure of damages by providing that the
total recovery may equal the greater of three months' periodic
rent or double actual damages, plus attorney's fees. In addition,
the unlawfully removed or excluded tenant may recover posses-
sion of the dwelling unit or terminate the rental agreement. 40
Prior to passage of the RLTA the Attorney General took
the position that, without first obtaining a writ of possession, a
sheriff or constable had no authority to make a forcible entry to
enforce a writ of ejectment.241 With the adoption of the RLTA,
the legislature amended the ejectment statute explicitly to per-
mit a deputy sheriff, but not a constable, to use the least de-
structive force necessary to enter a premises to execute a writ of
ejectment. Forcible entry is authorized only if the deputy sheriff
or constable first has given a copy of the writ to the occupants
and given them an opportunity to vacate voluntarily or if the
premises appear unoccupied.242
2. The Holdover Tenant
(a) Actions for Possession and Damages Against the Hold-
over Tenant. If a tenant fails to relinquish possession upon ter-
mination or expiration of the rental agreement, the only remedy
the RLTA provides for recovery of possession is the action in
ejectment. 24 3 The statute does not authorize a landlord to re-
cover possession by self-help. 4 In addition, if a new tenant has
239. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-37-140 (Law. Co-op 1976); Williams v. Columbia Mills
Co., 100 S.C. 363, 85 S.E. 160 (1915) (interpreting CiMv CODE 1912, § 3509, the predeces-
sor to § 27-37-140).
240. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-660 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
241. See 1979 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. 13.
242. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-37-160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
243. Although § 27-40-760 does provide that a landlord "may not recover or take
possession ... by action or otherwise ... except in case of abandonment, surrender,
termination, or as permitted," that section is limiting in nature and does not expressly
authorize the use of methods other than the ejectment action to recover possession fol-
lowing abandonment or termination. Id. § 27-40-760 (emphasis added).
244. The landlord's only right of self-help in connection with the recovery of posses-
sion is the right to enter, remove, and dispose of a small amount of personal property
that remains after the tenant has vacated. See infra notes 276-81 and accompanying
text.
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entered into a rental agreement with the landlord for possession
of that dwelling unit, the new tenant also may assert an action
for possession against the holdover tenant after the start of the
new term.245
The new tenant may be entitled to recover from the hold-
over tenant any actual damages incurred as a result of the fail-
ure to relinquish possession.240 If the holdover tenant acts
neither wilfully nor in bad faith, however, the landlord may not
have a claim for damages unless the holdover violates an express
provision of the rental agreement that the tenant will vacate at
the end of the term.247 If the failure to vacate is wilful and not in
good faith, both the landlord and the new tenant may recover
actual and punitive damages, so long as the total recovery of
each does not exceed the greater of three months' periodic rent
or twice the actual damages. Reasonable attorney's fees are also
recoverable.248 Unlike other damages provisions of the RLTA,
punitive damages, while available, are not mandated upon the
finding of a wilful, bad faith holdover. For residential tenancies,
this remedy replaces a prior statutory scheme 249 that imposed a
penalty of double the rental value whenever the tenant held over
for at least three months after a demand for possession.
If the failure to vacate is not wilful but is not in good faith,
the landlord may recover attorney's fees, but is not expressly en-
245. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-620(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). For a discussion of
the new tenant's remedy, if any, against the landlord in this situation, see supra notes
52-62 and accompanying text.
246. Id.
247. Section 27-40-770, which contains specific remedies against a holdover tenant,
permits an action for possession, but specifies that the landlord may pursue an action for
damages only if the holdover tenant acts wilfully or in bad faith. Id. § 27-40-770. Section
27-40-430 is of no help to the landlord since it merely incorporates by reference that
same damages provision. A landlord's claim for damages in the absence of wilfulness or
bad faith by the holdover tenant, then, must rest upon the general damages remedy
under § 27-40-710(c). If the holdover had violated some express provision of the rental
agreement by not relinquishing possession, the issue arises whether the general damages
remedy can provide relief when such relief is not provided under another, more specific
section regarding holdovers.
248. For the new tenant's remedy, see id. § 27-40-620(b). For the landlord's remedy,
see id. § 27-40-770(c). If the new tenant seeks recovery of three months rent, the RLTA
may refer either to the amount of rent paid by the holdover or to the amount agreed to
be paid by the new tenant. To the extent this section puts the new tenant in the shoes of
the landlord as against the holdover, however, the logical measure would be the rent paid
by the holdover.
249. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-35-170 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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titled to recover any other damages under section 27-40-770(c).
Section 27-40-220(a)(2), however, allows a new tenant who is un-
able to take possession because of the holdover to recover actual
damages without a showing that the holdover is wilful. No provi-
sion is made, however, for the new tenant's recovery of attor-
ney's fees.
The RLTA does not expressly provide in section 27-40-770
that a landlord may recover from the holdover a reasonable
rental value of the dwelling unit following termination of the
rental agreement but prior to recovery of possession by the land-
lord. The landlord, however, should remain entitled as under
prior law25 0 to recover a reasonable rental value for the period of
the holdover's occupation. The Oregon courts have interpreted
Oregon statutes similar to sections 27-40-770(c) and 27-40-
310(b) and (c) as providing the landlord with a right to receive a
reasonable rent during the period of the holdover, even if no new
term is created.251
(b) Creation of a New Term. Under the RLTA, the land-
lord's consent to the tenant's continued occupancy after termi-
nation of the rental agreement creates a new tenancy. 52 Unless
otherwise agreed by the parties, the new tenancy will be a peri-
odic tenancy from month-to-month (or week-to-week in the case
of a roomer who pays weekly rent).25 3 That the old rental agree-
ment provided for a different term should not alone be sufficient
to alter this result. On the other hand, nothing prevents the par-
ties from agreeing that, in the event of a holdover, the landlord
may consent to the creation of a new term binding the tenant
for a different length.
The question remains whether other provisions of the ex-
pired or terminated rental agreement will apply during the new
tenancy. Under prior statutory law in South Carolina, a tenant
who remained on the premises after a lease terminated was
260. See Lund v. Gray Line Water Tours, Inc., 277 S.C. 447, 289 S.E.2d 404 (1982).
251. See Fitzpatrick v. Robbins, 51 Or. App. 597, 626 P.2d 910 (1981) (interpreting
OR. REv. STAT §§ 91.855(3), 91.740(3), (4) (1984)); see also Kalish, supra note 95, at 676
(reaching conclusion that under similar Nebraska law the landlord may "bring an action
for restitution and damages"). This result also is consistent with S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-
37-150 and 27-40-790 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987), which require the payment of rent dur-
ing the period of an ejectment proceeding.
252. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-770(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
253. Id. (applying id. § 27-40-310(d)).
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treated as a tenant-at-will under section 27-33-10. Thus, the
parties were not bound by the terms of the prior lease and the
tenant was liable for "reasonable" rent during the tenancy-at-
will.
254
Section 27-33-10 changed the common-law rule that, if a
tenant held over with consent, a new term would be created and
the provisions of the expired lease applied.2m Conflicting argu-
ments may be made regarding whether the RLTA was intended
to restore, at least in part, the common-law result. On the one
hand, by providing expressly under section 27-40-310(d) for im-
plication of a new term by law, the RLTA arguably rejects the
common-law approach that the old agreement controls. It would
follow that, in the absence of a new agreement for rent, section
27-40-310(b) should apply, requiring the tenant to pay fair mar-
ket rental value.
On the other hand, section 27-40-770 of the RLTA expressly
provides only that section 27-40-310(d) controls the term of the
new tenancy. This express reference only to subsection (d) may
be interpreted to mean that other provisions of section 27-40-
310 implying rent at a fair-market rental value are not intended
to apply to the new tenancy. It would follow that the provisions
of the old rental agreement, except those governing the term of
the tenancy, may continue to control.
3. Limits on Retaliatory Action by Landlord
(a) Retaliatory Action for Possession. The RLTA restricts
the landlord's right to eject a tenant in retaliation for certain
complaints made by the tenant regarding the condition of the
premises. With some exceptions, a landlord may not bring a re-
taliatory action for possession once a tenant complains either to
an appropriate governmental agency about a code violation ma-
terially affecting health and safety or to the landlord about any
violation by the landlord of his obligations under the RLTA 56
254. Townsend v. Singleton, 257 S.C. 1, 183 S.E.2d 893 (1971).
255. See id. at 8, 183 S.E.2d at 896.
256. A retaliatory rental increase to an amount in excess of fair market value or a
retaliatory decrease in essential services also is proscribed under the RLTA. As when
there is a retaliatory action for possession, the tenant may terminate or recover damages
from the landlord. By implication, rent may be increased for any reason, including retali-
ation, up to the fair market rental value. If the landlord rents five or more adjoining
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The statutory defense of retaliatory eviction is derived from
similar statutory 57 and judicial258 determinations dating from
the 1960s that allowing the eviction of a tenant after the tenant
has complained of certain violations to either proper governmen-
tal authorities or the landlord does not further public policy. In
the leading case of Edwards v. Habib259 the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that adop-
tion of a municipal housing code altered the traditional landlord
and tenant relationship, limiting a landlord's power to evict a
tenant in these circumstances. Concluding that effective enforce-
ment of housing and building codes depends upon reports of
substandard conditions by the public, the court determined that
the prospect of a retaliatory eviction discouraged these reports
and thereby hindered code enforcement. Accordingly, "[w]hile
the landlord may evict for any legal reason or for no reason at
all," he may not "evict in retaliation for his tenant's report of
housing code violations to the authorities.
'26 0
Whether an attempted eviction is retaliatory is a question of
fact.26' In Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp.262 the court es-
tablished a common-law presumption of retaliatory intent in the
District of Columbia whenever an "unexplained eviction" fol-
lows an action for rent in which the tenant successfully asserted
a defense based upon substantial noncompliance with applicable
housing codes. The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act incorporates the retaliatory eviction defense, including a
presumption of retaliatory motive if the threatened eviction oc-
curs within one year of a protected complaint by the tenant.
263
Unlike the uniform provision, however, the RLTA does not
include any presumption or guidance indicating when conduct is
retaliatory. Nor does the RLTA indicate which party bears the
dwelling units on the premises, he may uniformly increase the rent even beyond fair
market value without a presumption of retaliation. The lack of a presumption, however,
apparently does not preclude a finding that the increase nevertheless was retaliatory.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-910 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
257. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 80, para. 71 (Smith-Hurd 1981) (effective July 15, 1963).
258. See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 699.
261. See id. at 702; Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 864 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
262. 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
263. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT, § 5.01, 7B U.LA. 503 (1972).
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burden of proof.2 4 If, similar to the Restatement position, the
tenant bears the burden of proving the existence of a subjective
retaliatory motive of the landlord, it may be difficult for the ten-
ant, without the benefit of any presumption, to assert success-
fully a defense under section 27-40-910. Attempting and failing
to prove retaliatory intent heightens the tenant's risk of liability
under section 27-40-910(b), which provides that if the defense is
raised without merit the landlord may recover attorney's fees.2 5
Despite the provisions against retaliatory eviction after a
tenant's complaint, the landlord may assert an action for posses-
sion in these situations: if a code violation results from the negli-
gence of the tenant or someone on the premises with his permis-
sion, if the tenant materially fails to comply with sections 27-40-
710 or 27-40-720, or if compliance with housing codes would re-
quire changes effectively denying the tenant the use of the
dwelling unit.266 The RLTA, however, expressly provides that,
while the landlord may recover possession in the listed circum-
stances, he nevertheless may remain liable for damages if his
primary motivation for the action for possession is retaliatory.
26 7
By expressly reserving the tenant's right to recover damages, the
RLTA appears to contemplate that a tenant may recover dam-
ages from the landlord for retaliatory conduct, even if the tenant
264. In S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-910(e) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987), which addresses a
retaliatory rental increase, the RLTA provides that a certain action does not create a
presumption of retaliation. By negative inference, that statement might be construed to
suggest that a presumption otherwise exists. But, there is no other expression to that
effect in the RLTA. The Restatement defines retaliatory action to include only action
"primarily motivated" by the tenant's protected conduct. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY (LANDLORD & TENANT) § 14.8 (1977). Comment f to § 14.8 places the initial
burden upon the tenant to establish that the landlord's action "was discriminatory and
followed at the first opportunity" after the protected conduct of the tenant. Factors sug-
gested in comment f as indicative of a lack of retaliatory motivation include (a) a show-
ing by the landlord that his was a reasonable exercise of business judgment; (b) a good
faith desire by the landlord to dispose of the property free of tenancies; (c) a good faith
desire by the landlord to use the property in a different manner; and (d) a lack of finan-
cial ability to repair accompanied by a good faith desire not to continue to lease to any
tenant.
265. If the defense is raised in bad faith, defined by implication in S.C. CODE ANN. §
27-40-210(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987) as conduct without honesty in fact, the landlord
may recover the greater of three months' rent or treble actual damages. This recovery is
in lieu of damages recoverable against a holdover under § 27-40-770 (erroneously re-
ferred to as § 27-40-760 in the Code).
266. Id. § 27-40-910(c).
267. Id. § 27-40-910(h).
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caused the violation about which he complained or if the tenant
failed to perform his own obligations under the RLTA.
When a prohibited retaliatory action for possession is insti-
tuted, the tenant is entitled to terminate the rental agreement
under section 27-40-660 and seek damages under section 27-40-
660 or 27-40-910(h). 8 Within ten days after service of the Rule
to Vacate or Show Cause, however, the tenant must notify the
landlord of his intent to defend on the basis of retaliation.8 9
The clear implication is that in the absence of such notice the
defense of retaliation will be waived.
(b) Retaliatory Refusal to Renew at Expiration. Under the
RLTA, a landlord's refusal to renew a rental agreement also may
be deemed retaliatory following a tenant's complaint to the
landlord of any violation of the RLTA or a complaint to an ap-
propriate governmental agency of a code violation materially af-
fecting health and safety.21 0 Such retaliatory conduct could sub-
ject the landlord to liability for damages under section 27-40-
910(h) and delay the landlord's right to recover possession for
seventy-five days,7 1 which presumably commence on the date of
expiration.
This restriction on the landlord's right to recover possession
arises only if the landlord has notice of the violation and of the
tenant's complaint prior to expiration of the rental agreement
and "if the tenant is not in default as to payment of rent.
2 7 2
The concept of default in the RLTA, however, is undefined and
ambiguous. The term appears elsewhere in the RLTA only in
section 27-40-730 which incorporates the terminology of a prior
statute. Several possible interpretations exist.
First, default could be construed to be any failure by the
tenant to pay rent on the date provided in the rental agreement.
268. See id. § 27-40-910(b), (h). Section 27-40-660 permits the tenant to terminate
and provides for damages equal to the greater of three months' rent or twice actual dam-
ages. Section 27-40-910(h) provides for damages up to the greater of three months' rent
or treble actual damages. Both provide reasonable attorney's fees. Given the larger po-
tential award under § 27-40-910(h), a plaintiff probably would seek actual damages
under that provision. If actual damages are minimal, the tenant may prefer to pursue an
award of three months' rent under § 27-40-660, since § 27-40-910(h) could provide no
greater award, but would permit a lesser award.
269. Id. § 27-40-910(f).
270. Id. § 27-40-910(g).
271. Id.
272. Id.
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Such an interpretation, however, would disregard the tenant's
right to withhold rent and to assert the landlord's noncompli-
ance as a defense to any action for possession. Second, default
could be limited to a failure to pay rent when due, but only if
the tenant waives the right to withhold payment. Finally, de-
fault could mean the tenant's failure to pay rent pursuant to
section 27-40-790 when the landlord brings an action for
possession.
This final interpretation best serves the interests of both
parties and the intent of the RLTA. By providing that the sev-
enty-five day delay in recovery of possession by the landlord will
be imposed only if the tenant proves the violation alleged, the
RLTA appears to contemplate that the landlord will commence
an action for possession immediately upon expiration of the
rental agreement,2 73 at which time the defense of retaliation will
be raised. The RLTA requires the tenant to pay any accrued
rent when the action is commenced,274 which adequately pro-
tects the landlord, while preserving the tenant's rights to with-
hold rent prior to the filing of the action. So long as the tenant
complies with the obligation to pay accrued rent when the action
for possession is filed, no sufficient policy reason supports deny-
ing him the opportunity to assert the retaliatory defense.275
4. Landlord's Right to Dispose of Personalty Remaining in
Dwelling Unit
If the tenant continues to live in the dwelling unit after the
end of the rental agreement, the landlord may regain possession
through an action for ejectment.276 Similarly, if the tenant no
longer lives in the dwelling unit, but has left personal property
on the premises, the general rule is that the landlord may re-
move that personalty only through ejectment procedures.277
273. If the landlord does not bring the action immediately, he risks a finding that he
has consented to a new term under § 27-40-770(c), thereby possibly delaying his recovery
of possession.
274. See id. § 27-40-790; supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
275. This interpretation, more than the alternatives, follows the recognition by the
Restatement that "a tenant may not be in default under a lease when he fails to pay the
rent because such action on the tenant's part may be justified." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF PROPERTY (LANDLORD & TENANT) § 14.8 comment e (1977).
276. See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
277. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-730(d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
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That general rule, however, is subject to one exception. If
the fair market value of personalty left on the premises does not
exceed $500, the landlord has a right of self-help when circum-
stances indicate that the tenant does not intend to return to the
dwelling unit.2 8 The landlord may remove and dispose of such
personalty if the rental agreement has ended, and the tenant has
removed a substantial portion of his property or voluntarily and
permanently terminated the utilities.279
Prior to the end of the rental agreement, the landlord also
may exercise self-help under section 27-40-730 to remove and
dispose of personalty not in excess of $500, after the tenant
abandons the dwelling unit. Section 27-40-730, however, is sub-
ject to two different interpretations. Self-help may be available
upon abandonment during the term only if the further condi-
tions of section 27-40-730(c) are satisfied, requiring removal of a
substantial portion of the property or termination of utilities.
On the other hand, the language of subsection 27-40-730(c) can
be read to impose further conditions upon the self-help remedy
only at the end of the term, and not upon abandonment of the
premises before the end of the term.
As a practical matter, since the self-help remedy is available
only when the total value of the property remaining does not
exceed $500, in most instances when the remedy is available, a
substantial portion of the tenant's property likely will have been
removed, thereby satisfying the further conditions of subsection
(c). If that is not the case, however, the mere act of abandon-
ment should be sufficient evidence of a tenant's intent not to
return to justify self-help, without requiring an additional act by
the tenant such as the termination of utilities. Indeed, this inter-
pretation is consistent with the RLTA's treatment of an aban-
donment alone as a sufficient basis upon which to allow the
landlord to re-let the entire dwelling unit.
In exercising the self-help remedy, the landlord is author-
ized expressly to use force, if necessary, to gain entry into the
dwelling unit.280 If the tenant later proves the property disposed
of has a fair market value in excess of $500, the landlord is not
liable to the tenant for any damages unless he was grossly
278. Id. § 27-40-730(c).
279. Id.
280. Id.
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negligent.""
B. Tenant's Right to Recover Security Deposits or Prepaid
Rent
A residential landlord still may require in the rental agree-
ment that a tenant post a security deposit. The South Carolina
RLTA, unlike the uniform version,2 82 imposes no limit on the
amount of security that may be demanded. If the rental agree-
ment is terminated under section 27-40-620(a) because the land-
lord fails to deliver possession at the commencement of the
term, then all of the security deposit must be returned to the
tenant.8 3 Otherwise, at the end of the term the landlord may
apply security deposit to the payment of accrued rent or to dam-
ages for the tenant's noncompliance with section 27-40-510.2
14
If the security deposit is applied to payment of rent or dam-
ages, the landlord must give written notice to the tenant, itemiz-
ing each deduction. Notice of the deductions and payment of the
balance of the deposit are required within thirty days after the
later of the date of termination, delivery of possession, or the
tenant's demand that the deposit be returned.285 If the tenant
does not give the landlord written notice of the tenant's new ad-
dress, and the landlord has no actual knowledge or reason to
know the tenant's address, the landlord may fulfill his obligation
by mailing the written notice and the balance of the deposit to
281. Id. § 27-40-730(e).
282. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT § 2.101(a), 7B UL-. 453 (1972)
(suggests limiting security deposits to not more than one month periodic rent).
283. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-620(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
284. Id. § 27-40-410(a). Since § 27-40-510(8) incorporates by reference the terms of
the rental agreement and rules and regulations, the security deposit may be applied to
damages for essentially any breach by the tenant. But see § 27-40-410(c); supra note 32
(limiting landlord's right to retain a portion of security deposit in certain situations).
285. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-410(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). To commence the 30-
day period at the earliest possible time, the tenant should demand a return of the de-
posit at the time that the rental agreement ends or possession is returned. Section 27-40-
240 sets forth the requirements for the form of the notice the landlord must give. A
tenant receives notice only when it is delivered in hand to him, or mailed by registered or
certified mail.
If the original landlord conveys the premises during the term of the rental agree-
ment, he remains liable for the security deposit unless the deposit is transferred to the
new owner and the tenant is notified in writing of that transfer within a reasonable time.
Once the deposit is transferred and proper notice is given to the tenant, the new owner
becomes subject to § 27-40-410. Id. § 27-40-450(a).
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the tenant's last known address.2 6
Having established the landlord's obligation to the tenant to
account for the security deposit upon termination, the RLTA
fails to provide any express remedy for noncompliance with that
obligation. The legislative history of section 27-40-410, however,
suggests that this omission was unintentional.
Section 2.101 of the Uniform Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act, from which section 27-40-410 is derived, provides a
remedy for the landlord's failure to return or account for both
the security deposit and prepaid rent. Similar language appeared
in section 18 of House Bill 2119 when the legislation was intro-
duced in South Carolina.
287
The House Labor, Commerce and Industry Committee did
not alter that language, but proposed an amendment to section
18, which was adopted, deleting its original paragraph (a).288
When the remaining paragraphs of section 18 were relettered to
reflect the Committee amendment, a cross reference that was
then contained in paragraph (b), referring to the landlord's obli-
gation to account for the security deposit, was incorrectly relet-
tered. As a result, the cross reference to security deposits made
little sense. That mistake, however, was not corrected and re-
mained in the bill as finally approved by the House and sent to
the Senate. s9
286. Id. § 27-40-410(a).
287. As introduced on January 10, 1985, H.R. 2119 provided in relevant part as
follows:
Section 18. Security Deposits; Prepaid Rent.
(c) If the landlord fails to comply with subsection (b) [current subsection
(a)] regarding security deposits or if he fails to return any prepaid rent re-
quired to be paid to the tenants under this act, the tenant may recover the
property and money in an amount equal to three times the amount wrongfully
withheld and reasonable attorney's fees.
H.R. 2199, 106th Gen'l Assembly, 1st Sess. (1985).
288. House of Representatives Committee on Labor, Commerce and Industry, Re-
port on H.R. 2119 (April 4, 1985).
289. See II 1985 H.R.J. 3564, 106th Gen' Assembly, 1st Sess. As approved by the
House of Representatives, H.R. 2119 read, in relevant part, as follows:
Section 18. Security Deposits: Prepaid Rent.
(b) If the landlord fails to comply with subsection (c) regarding security
deposits or if he fails to return any prepaid rent required to be paid to the
tenants under this act, the tenant may recover the property and money in an
amount equal to three times the amount wrongfully withheld and reasonable
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The reference to security deposits in paragraph (b) was de-
leted entirely by the Senate.90 It is clear that the Senate in-
tended to remove the nonsensical reference to security deposits
as contained in the House version. It is far less certain, however,
that the Senate, having imposed the obligations under para-
graph (a), intended to leave the tenant without any remedy to
enforce those obligations.
To give any enforceable effect to section 27-40-410(a), the
remedy set forth in section 27-40-410(b) for failure to return
prepaid rent must be applied equally to a failure to account
properly for the security deposit as it was in the initial draft of
the legislation. Under that interpretation, if the landlord did not
provide timely written notice and payment of any balance of the
deposit held, the tenant would be entitled to recover any prop-
erty held as security and damages in an amount equal to triple
the amount wrongfully withheld, plus attorneys' fees. The avail-
ability of that remedy, however, remains uncertain until the
courts or the legislature clarify the section.
VI. JURISDICTION, SERVICE, AND UNDERTAKING ON APPEAL
The magistrate courts and circuit courts have concurrent
original subject matter jurisdiction over claims arising under the
RLTA. Although the jurisdictional section of the RLTA refers
only to jurisdiction over landlords, 291 section 27-33-40 previously
conferred concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over landlord
and tenant matters. To the extent that the prior law is consis-
tent with the RLTA, it should continue to apply,292 permitting
either court to exercise jurisdiction regardless of which party ini-
tiates the action.
The tenant may gain personal jurisdiction over the landlord
by any traditional method or by substituted service of process
under section 27-40-130(b). A nonresident landlord or a corpo-
rate landlord not authorized to do business in South Carolina
attorney's fees.
H.R. 2119, 106th Gen'l Assembly, 1st Sess. (1985). The cross-reference within subsection
(b) should have been to subsection (a), rather than (c). There is no indication that the
mistake was other than clerical.
290. I 1986 S.J. 457, 106th Gen'l Assembly, 2d Sess.
291. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-130 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
292. See id. § 27-40-30.
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may designate an agent for service who must be a resident or a
corporation authorized to do business in the state. The designa-
tion must be in writing and filed with the Secretary of State.2"'
If no agent is appointed or service on the agent cannot be
made, service may be to the Secretary of State. Such substituted
service is effective only if the plaintiff mails a copy to the land-
lord at his last reasonably ascertainable address by certified or
registered mail, with a return receipt. An affidavit of compliance
must be filed with the court on or before the return day of the
process. 9 4
In addition to concurrent original jurisdiction, the circuit
court has appellate jurisdiction over matters decided in the mag-
istrate's court.2 95 If the magistrate's court has entered a judg-
ment for ejectment, the tenant is entitled to a stay of execution
of the judgment if he signs an undertaking26 that he will pay
rent as determined by the magistrate as it becomes due. The
stay may be signed by a magistrate, clerk, or circuit judge.
297
If the tenant thereafter fails to make any payment of rent
within five days of the due date under the terms of the under-
taking, the stay automatically is dissolved, the appeal is dis-
missed insofar as it pertains to issues of possession, and, upon
application of the landlord to the clerk, a warrant of ejectment
will be issued.298 Similar requirements apply to any appeal to
the supreme court from a decision of the circuit court.
299
VII. CONCLUSION
The RLTA incorporates into South Carolina law many of
the changes in the landlord and tenant relationship made in
other parts of the nation over the past several decades. By em-
293. Id. § 27-40-130.
294. Id. The RLTA contains no similar provision for substituted service upon a
tenant.
295. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-5-340 (Law. Co-op. 1976); see Vacation Time of Hilton
Head Island, Inc. v. Kiwi Corp., 280 S.C. 232, 312 S.E.2d 20 (Ct. App. 1984) (appellate
jurisdiction over ejectment cases not limited by § 23-33-40).
296. The undertaking must be substantially in the form set forth in S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 27-40-800 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
297. Id. § 27-40-800. If the undertaking is signed by the tenant, the court has no
discretion to deny the stay.
298. Id. § 27-40-800(c), (e).
299. Id. § 27-40-800(0.
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phasizing the contractual nature of the landlord and tenant rela-
tionship and imposing a number of statutory obligations upon
both parties, the RLTA fundamentally alters the nature of the
residential landlord and tenant relationship in this state.
History will tell whether the practical effect of the RLTA
upon dealings between residential landlords and tenants is revo-
lutionary. But the legislative recognition of various public poli-
cies underlying the RLTA, especially the policy of encouraging
the landlord to provide at least minimal levels of service and
maintenance, will at least inevitably hasten the evolution of that
relationship.
Ultimately, the compatibility of such policies with the eco-
nomic realities of the market place will dictate the direction of
that evolution. The purpose of this review is not to enter the
policy debate on either side, but merely to examine the law as
currently enacted, to offer interpretations of its ambiguities, and
to suggest areas in which additional clarification may be appro-
priate to achieve the stated purpose of the RLTA, which is to
simplify and modernize the law of landlord and tenant.
1988]
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